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I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)1 
in 1977 to regulate the conduct of debt collectors.2  It was not a 
surprising development, given the incredible stories about misconduct in 
the collection industry.3  Witnesses at the congressional hearings 
recounted the strategies that debt collectors used to achieve their 
objective, including telephone harassment and threats of reprisals for 
unpaid bills.4  These tactics were all the more regrettable since most 
consumers did not default on their obligations with any intent to defraud 
their creditors, but instead found themselves in difficulty because of 
                                                     
 ∗ Tallahassee Alumni Professor, Florida State University College of Law. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692o 
(2000)). 
 2. Its purpose was to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure 
that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not 
competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against 
debt collection abuses.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). 
 3. The Senate Report on the FDCPA reflected some of the problems as follows: 
Collection abuse takes many forms, including obscene or profane language, threats of 
violence, telephone calls at unreasonable hours, misrepresentation of a consumer’s legal 
rights, disclosing a consumer’s personal affairs to friends, neighbors, or an employer, 
obtaining information about a consumer through false pretense, impersonating public 
officials and attorneys, and simulating legal process. 
S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696. 
 4. One witness provided the following perspective of the collection abuses: 
  While debt collection agencies generate numbers of complaints disproportionate to 
their size in the American economy, the most disturbing aspect of consumer grievances 
generated by collection agencies is the type of conduct which is complained about.  This 
conduct, ranges from profanity and obscenity in phone calls to efforts to shame a 
consumer by contacting relatives, employers, neighbors to falsely threatening to seek 
harsh legal sanctions. 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Hearings on S. 656, S. 1130 and H.R. 5294 Before the 
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th 
Cong. 85, 85 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Robert J. Hobbs, Staff Attorney, National 
Consumer Law Center). 
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unforeseen circumstances.5  The average defaulting debtor faced 
unrelenting debt collectors who left no stone unturned in their quest for 
payment.6 
In drafting the FDCPA, Congress had to balance the interests of 
collectors and consumers, since it was evident that the vast majority of 
collectors did the right thing and were not abusive and deceptive in their 
collection efforts.7  Congress tried to reach a happy medium, but 
nevertheless, questions eventually arose about a collector’s obligations 
and the meaning of certain language in the legislation. 
There is no shortage of troublesome terms in the FDCPA.  The term 
“communication”8 appears frequently in the statute and has assumed an 
importance all its own.  This Article will consider the context in which 
communication can occur between a consumer and a collector.  It will be 
evident that problems arise because a communication may be oral or 
written.9  When the statute provides for a collector’s disclosure of certain 
information in an initial communication with the consumer, or within 
five days thereafter,10 it raises questions that have no easy answer.  
                                                     
 5. Professor Caplovitz gave some idea of the reasons why consumers default: 
  As my research has shown, the collection industry’s image of the default debtor as a 
deadbeat is a grotesque caricature that has virtually nothing to do with the realities of 
why debtors default. 
  . . . . 
  Of the 1331 debtors in default that we interviewed, no more than 4 per cent, that is, 
one in every twenty-five, corresponded to the classic image of the deadbeat.  And even in 
this tiny group, only a few entered the transaction with the deliberate intention to defraud 
the creditor.  Many more in this small group decided to stop paying when some untoward 
event occurred.  A number had their marriages turn sour and they decided to stop paying 
on their debts as they suddenly felt their lives falling apart.  Familial instability is thus 
another factor contributing to breakdowns in credit transactions. 
Hearings, supra note 4, at 238, 243 (testimony of Professor David Caplovitz, City University of 
New York). 
 6. One state official recounted a consumer’s experience with a debt collector: “They 
telephoned up to 40 times a day, ringing back as soon as we hung up.  The constant and pointless 
telephone calls caused us considerable worry and anxiety, not only because the collector was rude 
and insulting, but also because our business phone was virtually put out of commission.”  Id. at 619 
(testimony of Thomas Tahnk, Supervisor, Collection Agency Division, Minnesota Office of 
Consumer Services). 
 7. The Senate Report recognized the problem: “While unscrupulous debt collectors comprise 
only a small segment of the industry, the suffering and anguish which they regularly inflict is 
substantial.”  S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 2, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1696. 
 8. The FDCPA defines “communication” as “the conveying of information regarding a debt 
directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2000). 
 9. See id. (defining “communication” as occurring “through any medium”). 
 10. The statute requires a debt collector to provide certain information about the debt as 
follows: 
Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the 
collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is 
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Foremost among them is whether Congress could have intended that a 
collector convey orally to the consumer the details of the debt and the 
consumer’s right to dispute it, with the expectation that the consumer 
would easily digest the information.11 
Another question that has provoked some judicial disagreement 
relates to legal pleadings.12  If they constitute a communication, then they 
are subject to the normal rules relating to the right of a consumer to seek 
verification of the debt.13  The constituencies that argue for excluding a 
summons and complaint from the definition of “communication” do so 
with some nostalgia about the days when lawyers enjoyed an exemption 
from the FDCPA.14  Even though such an exemption has long 
                                                                                                                                  
contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the 
consumer a written notice containing— 
 (1) the amount of the debt; 
 (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 
 (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, 
disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to 
be valid by the debt collector; 
 (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the 
thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector 
will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and 
a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt 
collector; and 
 (5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, 
the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the 
original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2000). 
 11. The problem arises because the statute gives a debt collector an option.  The collector may 
provide the information required by § 1692g(a) either in its initial communication (which need not 
be written), or in a written notice within five days thereafter.  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
Staff Commentary provides that “[i]f a debt collector’s first communication with the consumer is 
oral, he may make the disclosures orally at that time in which case he need not send a written 
notice.”  FTC Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 
50,108 (Dec. 13, 1988) [hereinafter FTC Staff Commentary].  The FTC Staff publishes its 
interpretations of the FDCPA in its Commentary, but the Commentary does not have the force or 
effect of the statute and is not binding on the FTC or the public.  Id. at 50,101.  Nevertheless, the 
Commentary is helpful in understanding the statute. 
 12. Compare Thomas v. Law Firm of Simpson & Cybak, 392 F.3d 914, 920 (7th Cir. 2004) (en 
banc) (holding that summons and complaint do constitute an initial communication under FDCPA), 
with Vega v. McKay, 351 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that summons and 
complaint do not constitute an initial communication under FDCPA). 
 13. The collector must inform the consumer in the “initial communication,” or within five days 
thereafter, of the right to seek verification of the debt.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 
 14. In Vega, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the FTC Staff Commentary which stated that the 
institution of legal action was not a communication.  See 351 F.3d at 1336–37 (citing FTC Staff 
Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,108).  This nonbinding FTC interpretation preceded the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995), which held that the FDCPA applies 
to lawyers who regularly collect debts through litigation.  The Court in Heintz highlighted the fact 
that Congress had withdrawn the FDCPA exemption for lawyers and had not replaced it with any 
litigation-related provision.  Id. at 294–95. 
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disappeared,15 some debt collectors share the nagging feeling that 
litigation enjoys a special place in the scheme of things, and that a 
summons and complaint should not be subject to the FDCPA.16  This 
Article will discuss the divisions on this matter and will suggest that 
there is more legislative work to be done if a summons and complaint are 
not to be regarded as a communication. 
This Article will also review some of the strategies employed by 
enterprising debt collectors.17  When it is not an attorney threatening 
legal action,18 it is someone else trying to convince a consumer that an 
attorney will soon be involved, and that it is advantageous for the 
consumer to settle the matter promptly.19  The cases will show how far a 
debt collector can go in trying to realize its objective of recovering the 
debt.  Quite often it is the subtlety of the language that leads to a 
consumer’s distress, and it is then a court’s assignment to distinguish 
between a bizarre interpretation and a reasonable construction of the 
collection letter.  Other problems arise when a collector leaves no stone 
unturned in exaggerating the amount of the debt by including fees and 
costs not yet due.20  The collector’s strategy in this context is to create a 
                                                     
 15. See Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768 (1986) (amending section 803(6) of the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (1982)). 
 16. In Thomas v. Law Firm of Simpson & Cybak, the defendants contended that treating a 
summons and complaint as an “initial communication” would create problems “by making debt 
collection lawsuits more cumbersome for attorneys.”  392 F.3d at 918.  The Supreme Court had 
rejected similar arguments in Heintz v. Jenkins.  See 514 U.S. at 296–97 (holding that a court-related 
document qualifies as a communication). 
 17. The FDCPA forbids a collector to use any “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or 
means in connection with the collection of any debt.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2000).  Without limiting 
the application of that general language, the section then describes sixteen examples of prohibited 
conduct.  Id. § 1692e(1)–(16). 
 18. See Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991) (threat of immediate legal 
action if debt not paid within ten days was a violation); Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 571 
(3d Cir. 1989) (holding that threat to take legal action that debt collector did not intend to take was a 
violation); Goins v. JBC & Assocs., P.C., 352 F. Supp. 2d 262, 272 (D. Conn. 2005) (threat to sue 
was improper); Edwards v. McCormick, 136 F. Supp. 2d 795, 806 (D. Ohio 2001) (finding that 
attorney threatened action he could not legally take). 
 19. See Goswami v. Am. Collections Enter., Inc., 377 F.3d 488, 496 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that settlement offers must be nondeceitful); Pipiles v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 25–26 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (holding that threat of legal action the collector did not intend to take constitutes a 
violation of §§ 1692e(5) and (10)); Schimmel v. Slaughter, 975 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (M.D. Ga. 
1997) (holding that collection letter falsely implied that file had been turned over to attorney whose 
private practice was separate from the credit bureau). 
 20. See Veach v. Sheeks, 316 F.3d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 2003) (where a debt collector sought 
treble damages from debtor who wrote a bad check); Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 
379, 387 (3d Cir. 2000) (where a debt collector sought unusually high interest and penalties); Duffy 
v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871, 873 (8th Cir. 2000) (where debt collector overstated interest charges in 
collection letters); Padilla v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 264, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (where a debt collector sought to collect attorney’s fees from the debtor); Ballard v. Equifax 
Check Servs., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1167 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (where an authorization and guarantee 
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sense of hopelessness in the consumer, who may then be willing to meet 
the collector halfway in order to settle the debt.  The tendency of the 
courts is to insist on certainty as to the amount due as of the date of the 
collector’s letter, without detracting from the collector’s ability to 
explain the circumstances under which the amount might change.21 
There is another provision in the FDCPA that commands attention.  
It is § 1692g, requiring a debt collector to notify the consumer that if the 
consumer disputes the debt in writing, the debt collector will seek 
verification thereof from the creditor.22  It is fair to say that there are 
frequent disagreements over the validation section, since a debt collector 
usually wants to press on with its debt recovery efforts, while advising 
the consumer about his validation rights.  There is nothing in the statute 
that requires the collector to suspend its activities during the thirty days 
granted to the consumer for disputing the debt, because that period is not 
a grace period.23  Nevertheless, as the cases will show, courts are 
constantly struggling to strike a happy medium between the consumer’s 
right to dispute the debt and the collector’s right to send an effective 
collection message in the same communication.24  It seems as if this 
struggle will continue unless Congress amends the statute with a view to 
relieving the tension between the competing interests of collectors and of 
consumers.  This Article will consider the problems that are inherent in 
the present statutory language.  It will also discuss the difficulty of  
 
                                                                                                                                  
service sought to collect a twenty-dollar returned check fee in violation of the FDCPA). 
 21. See Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872, 
876 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a debt collector has a duty to state the amount of the debt owed); 
Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 502 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that debt collection letters cannot be 
confusing); McDowall v. Leschack & Grodensky, P.C., 279 F. Supp. 2d 197, 199, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (holding that a collector violated FDCPA by not stating the amount of interest owed and by 
including attorney’s fees in the balance due). 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) (2000). 
 23. The statute requires the collector to cease collection activities only if the consumer disputes 
the debt in writing within thirty days after receiving the validation notice.  Id. § 1692g(b).  The 
collector may then resume activities once it mails the verification information to the consumer.  Id.  
The FTC does not regard the thirty-day dispute period as a grace period.  Mezines, FTC Advisory 
Opinion (Mar. 31, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/fdcpaadvisoryopinion.htm [hereinafter 
Advisory Opinion]. 
 24. See Shimek v. Forbes, 374 F.3d 1011, 1014 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a debt collector 
could send a dunning letter to a debtor at the same time it filed a lien with the clerk of court); 
McStay v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that an ambiguity later clarified 
did not violate the FDCPA notice provision); United States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d 131, 139 
(4th Cir. 1996) (holding that a notice on the back of a collection letter was not false or deceptive); 
Gervais v. Riddle & Assocs., 363 F. Supp. 2d 345, 355 (D. Conn. 2005) (holding that 
communications from the debt collector were false and misleading and that collection letter 
contradicted and overshadowed validation notice). 
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reconciling the absence of a writing requirement in § 1692g(a)(3) with 
the presence of such a requirement in § 1692g(a)(4).25 
Finally, the Article will conclude with a discussion of two provisions 
that prohibit a debt collector from engaging in unfair practices to collect 
a debt.  The first one relates to the kind of language that a collector may 
use on an envelope when it communicates with a consumer,26 and the 
second concerns the controls that are in place to regulate a collector’s 
nonjudicial action to repossess property that is under the consumer’s 
control.27 
II. THE ELEMENT OF COMMUNICATION 
A. The Importance of the Term 
There is hardly ever any disagreement about the importance of 
communication in the commercial world.  In the debt collection business, 
communication is sometimes encouraged, other times forbidden.28  But 
the courts must decide whether there has been any communication 
between a debt collector and a debtor before imposing any liability on 
the debt collector under the FDCPA. 
The FDCPA defines “communication” as “the conveying of 
information regarding a debt.”29  With certain exceptions, a collector 
must not communicate with third parties about a consumer’s debt unless 
it is seeking information about a debtor’s location.30  On the other hand, a 
collector must give a debtor, in its initial communication or within five 
days thereafter, notice of the right to dispute the debt and must provide 
                                                     
 25. Section 1692g(a)(3) allows a collector to assume that a debt is valid if the consumer does 
not dispute the validity of the debt within thirty days after receiving a validation notice.  15 U.S.C. § 
1692g(a)(3).  On the other hand, § 1692g(a)(4) requires a consumer to dispute the debt in writing if 
he wants the collector to seek verification from the creditor.  Id. § 1692g(a)(4). 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8) (2000). 
 27. Id. § 1692f(6). 
 28. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1692c (2000) (forbidding communication except in certain 
circumstances), with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (requiring validation notice). 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2000). 
 30. Section 1692c(b) provides as follows: 
Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior written consent of the 
consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of 
competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial 
remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any 
debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency 
if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of 
the debt collector. 
15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). 
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other details required by the validation provision.31  It is important to fix 
the time of communication because that is the marker for determining 
when a collector must give the debtor the required validation notice.  In 
the first place, the statute does not require that a communication must be 
in writing to be valid.32  This means, therefore, that a collector can 
include all of the information required by § 1692g in its initial 
communication even if that communication is oral.33  This is not 
particularly advantageous to the debtor because he can hardly be 
expected to assimilate the details of the validation notice through an oral 
encounter with the collector. 
Although a debt collector can provide the necessary information in 
the initial communication, it is really an option that does not take a 
debtor’s situation into account.  A debtor is rarely in a frame of mind to 
receive an oral communication of this sort, particularly if he is unfamiliar 
with the collector’s claim.34  It is understandable that Congress wanted to 
ensure that a collector would disclose the salient aspects of the 
transaction, but in doing so it lost sight of the fact that the “written 
notice” that must follow within five days does not require that the initial 
communication itself be written.35  The validation notice can be truly 
effective only if the collector is required to provide it in writing, 
regardless of the time of disclosure. 
B. Legal Pleadings 
Although the term “communication” is normally associated with the 
contact between a debt collector and a debtor, legal pleadings present 
their own challenges.  There is some question about treating a summons 
and complaint as a communication, because they confuse the consumer 
with details that may conflict with the information in the validation 
                                                     
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 
 32. “Communication” is the “conveying of information . . . through any medium.”  15 U.S.C. § 
1692a(2). 
 33. The FTC Staff Commentary provides some support for oral notice by stating that “[i]f a 
debt collector’s first communication with the consumer is oral, he may make the disclosures orally at 
that time in which case he need not send a written notice.”  FTC Staff Commentary, supra note 11, 
at 50,108.  But see NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR DEBT COLLECTION § 5.7.2.4, at 215–16 (5th 
ed. 2004) (exploring the legislative history of § 1692g and suggesting that any ambiguity should be 
resolved in favor of written notice). 
 34. The Senate Report explained the validation notice as follows: “After initially contacting a 
consumer, a debt collector must send him or her written notice stating the name of the creditor and 
the amount owed.”  S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699. 
 35. The definition of “communication” contributes to the confusion.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) 
(defining “communication”).  The drafters must have lost sight of the relationship between the 
“communication” and the details required to be disclosed by the collector. 
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notice.36  This is particularly alarming if the debt collector includes that 
notice with the summons and complaint, each carrying its own period for 
the consumer to act.37  It is also arguable that a consumer can halt a 
lawsuit by seeking verification of the debt, even after the collector serves 
its summons and complaint.38  Furthermore, a consumer may be able to 
frustrate service of those documents by retaining counsel and asking the 
debt collector to deal with his lawyer only.39 
Nevertheless, the FDCPA’s definition of “communication” is broad 
and does not contain any exceptions.40  It is difficult, therefore, to ignore 
the statute’s plain language in order to accommodate some 
administrative peculiarities.  There is no evidence that a literal 
interpretation of the statute will lead to some absurd result that 
countermands congressional intent.41  After all, the whole objective of 
the statute is to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive collection 
practices,42 and if a legal pleading does not fall within the category of an 
“initial communication,” then a debt collector can simply proceed to 
litigation without any obligation to provide the statutory validation 
notice.  This possibility runs counter to the statutory scheme that 
provides a mechanism for a consumer to challenge the debt collector’s  
 
                                                     
 36. The court in Thomas v. Law Firm of Simpson & Cybak alluded to some of the problems: 
  While the § 1692g notice indicates that the debtor has 30 days to dispute his debt, in 
federal court a defendant must answer a complaint within 20 days of its filing . . . .  Thus, 
the validation notice could potentially give a debtor the false impression that it has 30 
days before it is required to take any action in the lawsuit. 
392 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 37. For example, in a federal action, a defendant must answer a complaint within twenty days.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A).  On the other hand, a consumer has thirty days to dispute the debt.  15 
U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) (2000). 
 38. This was one of the collector’s concerns in Thomas.  392 F.3d at 919. 
 39. See id. at 920 (recognizing that “[i]f pleadings are ‘communications’ under the FDCPA, in 
any jurisdiction in which a defendant must be personally served, a debtor could arguably thwart 
service by simply retaining an attorney.”). 
 40. Communication is “the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to 
any person through any medium.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 
 41. The Seventh Circuit said it best in Jenkins v. Heintz: “We must faithfully apply the law as 
Congress drafted it.  We should not disregard plain statutory language in order to impose on the 
statute what we may consider a more reasonable meaning.”  25 F.3d 536, 539 (7th Cir. 1994), aff’d, 
514 U.S. 291 (1995); see also 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 46:01 (6th ed. 2000 & Supp. 2006) (discussing the “plain meaning rule” of statutory 
interpretation). 
 42. The Senate Report states clearly that the FDCPA’s purpose is “to protect consumers from a 
host of unfair, harassing, and deceptive debt collection practices without imposing unnecessary 
restrictions on ethical debt collectors.”  S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 1–2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696. 
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claim informally, without having to engage the collector immediately in 
a litigation context.43 
Treating a legal pleading as an initial communication serves the 
interest of debt collectors and consumers alike.  It leads inevitably to a 
validation notice that informs the consumer of the right to dispute the 
debt.44  If the consumer exercises that right, the debt collector is then put 
on notice that something may be amiss, and thus is forced to delve into 
the validity of the claim.  The consumer can express doubts about his 
alleged liability, and the debt collector can reassure itself about the 
transaction without expending too much energy and resources.45  The 
attempt to exclude legal pleadings from treatment as an initial 
communication is really only a continuation of previous attempts to 
carve out a special place for litigation activities.  When a collector tried it 
in Heintz v. Jenkins,46 the Supreme Court of the United States let it be 
known that the FDCPA applies to lawyers who regularly attempt to 
collect debts through litigation.47  Despite such coverage, the Court was 
confident that the statute does not give a consumer the right to stop a 
collector’s litigation activities under § 1692c(c), for the statute has 
exceptions that allow a debt collector to inform the consumer that it 
intends to invoke a certain remedy.48  If the collector can disclose its 
intent about the remedy, it can surely invoke the actual remedy.49  The 
Court, therefore, did not read that language as preventing the FDCPA 
from covering an attorney-collector because such language was 
consistent with the preservation of the collector’s judicial remedies.50 
                                                     
 43. The validation section is intended to “eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors 
dunning the wrong person or attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already paid.”  Id. 
at 4, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1699. 
 44. The debt collector must include the validation notice in the initial communication or within 
five days thereafter.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2000). 
 45. It has been said that the validation section provides “an informal method of dispute 
resolution that conserves tax dollars and judicial resources.”  NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra 
note 33, § 5.7.1, at 212.  Congress regarded the section as a “significant feature of [the] legislation.”  
S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 4, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1699.  The Senate Report confirmed 
that the provision would not cause any additional expense or paperwork because most collectors 
send similar information to consumers.  Id. 
 46. 514 U.S. 291 (1995). 
 47. Id. at 294. 
 48. Id. at 296. 
 49. See id. (explaining that the exceptions can be read “to imply that they authorize the actual 
invocation of the remedy that the collector ‘intends to invoke’”). 
 50. See id. at 294 (“In ordinary English, a lawyer who regularly tries to obtain payment of 
consumer debts through legal proceedings is a lawyer who regularly ‘attempts’ to ‘collect’ those 
consumer debts.”) (emphasis added) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 263 (6th ed. 1990)). 
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When the Seventh Circuit had a second try at the issue in Thomas v. 
Law Firm of Simpson & Cybak,51 it confirmed that a summons and 
complaint constituted a communication under the FDCPA and it allayed 
collectors’ fears that this decision would empower a consumer to stop the 
litigating collector in its tracks.52  Although it is true that a consumer can 
seek verification of a debt within thirty days after receiving a validation 
notice, a debt collector can avoid that difficulty by having its initial 
communication with the consumer and then waiting thirty days to serve 
its pleadings.53  This strategy would still allow the consumer the 
opportunity to exercise his validation rights, while making way for the 
debt collector to begin litigation without fear of interruption.54 
There is another advantage to separating an initial communication 
from the service of the legal pleadings.  It would insulate the debt 
collector from the charge that it has confused the consumer with different 
documents having varying deadlines.55  The FDCPA gives the consumer 
thirty days to dispute a debt, but court rules may prescribe other limits 
for the consumer’s response in the litigation context.56  This is the classic 
                                                     
 51. 392 F.3d 914, 918 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 52. See id. (citing the Supreme Court’s rejection in Heintz of the collector’s arguments that 
subjecting lawyers to the FDCPA would create insuperable difficulties for the litigation process). 
 53. Id. at 919; see also En Banc Seventh Circuit: Collector’s Summons and Complaint 
Triggered Consumer’s FDCPA Debt Validation Rights, 23 NCLC REPORTS: DEBT COLLECTION 
AND REPOSSESSIONS EDITION 11–12 (Nov./Dec. 2004) (citing the court’s recommendation to send 
debt validation notices thirty days before suit); How May Plaintiff’s Lawyer Comply with the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act, 36 CONSUMER CREDIT & TRUTH-IN-LENDING COMPLIANCE REPORT 
3 (Earl Phillips ed. Mar. 2005) (“‘Initially communicating’ with the consumer more than 30 days 
before . . . avoids other complications.”). 
 54. The Thomas court provided some guidance on the kind of language that a collector should 
use in the validation notice if the collector felt it necessary because of other concerns to include the 
notice with the summons and complaint or within five days thereafter.  See 392 F.3d at 919 
(explaining that if the debt collector does not notify the debtor of his rights in the initial 
communication, the debt collector “should take care to phrase its notice so as to not mislead”).  The 
court’s safe-harbor language was as follows: 
This advice pertains to your dealings with me as a debt collector.  It does not affect your 
dealings with the court, and in particular it does not change the time at which you must 
answer the complaint.  The summons is a command from the court, not from me, and you 
must follow its instructions even if you dispute the validity or amount of the debt.  The 
advice in this letter also does not affect my relations with the court.  As a lawyer, I may 
file papers in the suit according to the court’s rules and the judge’s instructions. 
Id. at 919–20. 
 55. See id. (explaining the confusion that can arise when the debtor has twenty days to answer 
the complaint, but thirty days to dispute a debt in federal court). 
 56. See id. at 919 (“A debtor must comply with deadlines imposed by court rules and judges, 
even if that debtor has requested verification of the debt.”)  State rules may also prevent a collector 
from including a validation notice in court documents.  In that event, the best approach is for the 
collector to provide the validation notice to the consumer before serving the court papers or within 
five days thereafter.  See Advisory Opinion, supra note 23 (demonstrating that regardless of where 
the consumer lives—in a jurisdiction that prohibits including validation notices with court 
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scenario for a claim that the litigation documents contradict or 
overshadow the validation notice.57  A consumer could be confused by 
the statutory deadlines.58  This is not to say that a debt collector is 
helpless in the face of these requirements.  If a debt collector wants to 
start litigation within the thirty-day period and run the risk that the 
consumer will seek verification of the debt during that time, it must take 
every precaution to explain in its communication how the validation 
notice and the legal pleadings fit together, so that it does not mislead the 
consumer into forfeiting his rights under either procedure.59  There is 
nothing unusual about this approach, for the Seventh Circuit rose to the 
occasion in another context by providing a model collection letter for the 
guidance of debt collectors when there was potential for confusion, and 
the court wanted to show how a debt collector could assert its claim 
while simultaneously preserving the consumer’s right to dispute the 
debt.60 
When a collector knows that a consumer has retained a lawyer, the 
FDCPA prevents the debt collector from communicating with the 
consumer.61  A consumer can create problems for a debt collector in a 
jurisdiction where a person must be personally served with court 
documents for litigation to proceed.  In that event, the debt collector 
should be able to communicate, with a court’s permission, in the form of 
                                                                                                                                  
documents or one that permits this practice—the consumer will receive the notice). 
 57. In Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A. v. Martinez (In re Martinez), 271 B.R. 696, 699 (S.D. 
Fla. 2001), aff’d, 311 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002), the validation notice appeared as page eight of a 
sixteen-page foreclosure document.  The court found that “the hypothetical least sophisticated 
consume[r] would likely respond to the foreclosure complaint within the prescribed thirty days, 
ignoring his FDCPA rights, as the language in the summonses and foreclosure complaint 
overshadows the message required to be effectively conveyed by the FDCPA Notice.”  Id. at 701.  
The collector made no attempt to reconcile or explain the conflicting requirements of the validation 
notice and of the legal pleadings.  Id.  Courts have frequently found a validation notice to be 
ineffective if it is accompanied by other language that renders the communication contradictory or 
overshadowing.  E.g., Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1997); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 
F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1993); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 58. Thomas, 392 F.3d at 919.  There is a potential for confusion because although the validation 
notice gives a debtor thirty days to dispute a debt, the federal rules require a defendant to answer a 
complaint within twenty days.  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2000) (giving a debtor thirty days to 
challenge the validity of a debt), with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A) (giving a defendant only twenty 
days to respond to a complaint). 
 59. The Thomas court provided some safe-harbor language that responded to these concerns.  
392 F.3d at 919–20.  This was not the first time that the Seventh Circuit found itself in the position 
of providing some guidance on appropriate language.  See Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, 
Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2000) (suggesting language that would 
satisfy disclosure of the amount of the debt under § 1692g(a)(1)); Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 501–02 
(suggesting a safe-harbor letter that would avoid a violation by reconciling the validation notice with 
the collector’s right to collect the debt). 
 60. See Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 501–02 (providing the court’s model collection letter). 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) (2000). 
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legal pleadings with the represented consumer so as to solve this 
potential problem.62  This mechanism allows the debt collector to achieve 
its objective without violating the statutory prohibition against contacting 
the consumer against his will.  Congress did not intend to suppress a debt 
collector’s right to begin the litigation process by merely allowing a 
consumer to demand that the debt collector cease communicating.63  
Thus, even in the face of these administrative challenges, it is not 
reasonable to ignore the plain language of the statute by treating legal 
pleadings as if they are not a communication. 
It is noteworthy that the FDCPA does address legal actions by debt 
collectors, and some have argued that since § 1692i merely regulates 
venue issues, Congress did not intend to cover abuses dealing with legal 
pleadings.64  But if Congress had already decided that legal pleadings fell 
within the definition of “communication,” it would have been 
unnecessary to complicate matters by including language in § 1692i that 
had nothing to do with venue.  Furthermore, when the drafters wanted to 
ensure that a particular provision would not cover a legal pleading, they 
knew how to do so by creating a specific exemption for it.65  Thus, a debt 
                                                     
 62. The Thomas court observed that exceptions in § 1692c could be interpreted as allowing 
personal service on a represented consumer: “For instance, § 1692c(a) permits communication with 
debtors represented by attorneys with the express permission of the court.  Court rules permitting 
service could be interpreted as granting such express permission.”  392 F.3d at 920; see also En banc 
Seventh Circuit, supra note 53, at 12 (concluding the law allows debt collectors to serve a summons 
and complaint on a debtor represented by an attorney); How May Plaintiff’s Lawyer Comply with the 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, supra note 53, at 4 (same). 
 63. The petitioners in Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 296 (1995), had raised similar questions 
about the difficulties that lawyers would face if the Court subjected the lawyer’s litigation activities 
to the FDCPA.  The Court responded in this way: 
  We agree with Heintz that it would be odd if the Act empowered a debt owing 
consumer to stop the “communications” inherent in an ordinary lawsuit and thereby cause 
an ordinary debt-collecting lawsuit to grind to a halt.  But, it is not necessary to read § 
1692c(c) in that way—if only because that provision has exceptions that permit 
communications “to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke” 
or “intends to invoke” a “specified remedy” (of a kind “ordinarily invoked by [the] debt 
collector or creditor”).  §§ 1692c(c)(2), (3).  Courts can read these exceptions, plausibly, 
to imply that they authorize the actual invocation of the remedy that the collector “intends 
to invoke.”  The language permits such a reading, for an ordinary court-related document 
does, in fact, “notify” its recipient that the creditor may “invoke” a judicial remedy. 
Id. 
 64. See McKnight v. Benitez, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1305 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (referring to 15 
U.S.C. § 1692i (2000), which deals with legal actions by debt collectors).  The court suggested that 
Congress would have included in § 1692i anything that related to legal remedies, including the filing 
of a legal pleading.  Id. 
 65. Section 1692e exempts “a formal pleading made in connection with a legal action.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2000).  So a debt collector does not have to indicate in such a pleading that it is 
attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose.  Neither 
does it have to state that the communication is from a debt collector.  Id. 
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collector does not have to state in a formal pleading that such 
communication is from a debt collector, although a debt collector must 
include such a statement in all other communications after the first.66  
This § 1692e(11) exception leaves no doubt that Congress intended to 
exclude legal pleadings from the communications that must contain the 
appropriate statutory language.  If Congress did not regard such a legal 
pleading as a communication, it would have been unnecessary to draft 
this specific language to exclude a legal pleading from § 1692e(11).67 
The Eleventh Circuit came to a different conclusion in Vega v. 
McKay,68 but it relied on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Staff 
Commentary which took the position that a legal pleading was not a 
communication.69  Now that a subsequent FTC Advisory Opinion has 
stated that it is a communication,70 the Eleventh Circuit has lost the 
support for its decision.  In all fairness, one must remember that the 
Commentary on which the Eleventh Circuit relied preceded the Heintz 
decision, and thus the FTC did not have the advantage of the Court’s 
view that lawyers were not exempt from the FDCPA.71  Now that the 
FTC has made its position clear, the Eleventh Circuit will have to seek a 
basis elsewhere to support its position.  It is doubtful that it can make a 
compelling case in light of the Seventh Circuit’s approach in Thomas.  
The essential inquiry remains whether Congress would have wanted to 
exclude a legal pleading from the definition of “communication” if that 
would allow a debt collector to avoid its validation obligation.72  It seems 
                                                     
 66. Id.; see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 33, § 5.5.14.1, at 191–92. 
 67. See Goldman v. Cohen, 446 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2006) (the term “communication” 
includes legal pleadings); Nichols v. Byrd, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1106 (D. Nev. 2006) (same); 
Alger v. Ganick, O’Brien & Sarin, 35 F. Supp. 2d 148, 158 n.18 (D. Mass. 1999) (same); Gunter v. 
Columbus Check Cashiers, Inc. (In re Gunter), 334 B.R. 900, 905–06 (Bankr. S. D. Ohio 2005) 
(same). 
 68. 351 F.3d 1334 (2003). 
 69. The court in Vega v. McKay explained as follows: “In making this decision we give serious 
consideration to the interpretation put forth by the Federal Trade Commission which is the agency 
changed [sic] with enforcing the provisions of the FDCPA and has developed the expertise in this 
area.”  Id. at 1337.  The court agreed with McKnight v. Benitez, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1308 (M.D. 
Fla. 2001), which had also relied on the FTC Staff Commentary.  Vega, 351 F.3d at 1336–37. 
 70. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 23 (stating that “if an attorney debt collector serves on a 
consumer a court document ‘conveying [] information regarding a debt,’ that court document is a 
‘communication’ for the purposes of the FDCPA”). 
 71. The FTC Staff issued the Commentary in 1988, and the Supreme Court decided Heintz v. 
Jenkins in 1995.  See supra notes 11, 14. 
 72. In Thomas v. Law Firm of Simpson & Cybak, the Seventh Circuit explained the loophole 
that would result from not treating a legal pleading as a communication: 
Such a loophole, creating an end-run around the validation notice requirement, is 
inconsistent with the drafters’ intention of protecting debtors from “unfair, harassing, and 
deceptive” collection tactics, especially because many debtors cannot afford to hire 
attorneys to represent them in collection actions.  Congress was careful to except 
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unlikely, given Congress’s careful crafting of an exception in § 
1692e(11). 
C. Other Legal Actions 
Communication can come in many forms.  A legal pleading is not 
the only mechanism that has raised questions.  Similar queries were 
raised in Romea v. Heiberger & Associates,73 when the defendant sent a 
three-day rent demand notice to the consumer that was required before 
beginning a summary eviction proceeding.74  Despite the defendant’s 
contention that the summary eviction proceeding concerned the “rights 
of possession of real property,”75 the Second Circuit held that the letter 
the defendant sent to the consumer was a communication because it 
conveyed information regarding a debt.76  Although the notice that the 
defendant sent was a condition precedent to the institution of the eviction 
proceeding, an action in rem, the defendant intended the letter to be an 
inducement to the consumer to pay the debt.77  The notice demanding 
payment was not a part of the eviction proceeding, but rather a precursor 
to it, and it informed the consumer about what he must do if he hoped to 
avoid that proceeding.78  In using the notice to obtain payment, the 
defendant was open to the same temptations that plague the collection 
process, and the fact that the debtor’s delinquency might lead to 
summary eviction did not change the nature of the notice required by the 
statute under consideration in Romea.79 
                                                                                                                                  
pleadings from the definition of “communication” where it so intended. 
392 F.3d 914, 918 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 73. 163 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 74. Id. at 113. 
 75. Id. at 116.  The purpose of an Article 7 proceeding under New York Law is to provide a 
procedure “to recover real property.”  N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1979); see 
also Tivoli Assocs. v. Wing, 471 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1019 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984) (referring to Article 7’s 
subject matter as “the right of possession of real property”). 
 76. Romea, 163 F.3d at 116. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 113; see also Paulemon v. Tobin, 30 F.3d 307, 310 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that letters 
sent to a debtor do not qualify under a litigation exemption to the FDCPA, if one exists); J.D. Realty 
Assocs. v. Jorrin, 632 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1995) (referring to the three-day notice as “a 
notice to the tenant of what must be done to forestall a summary proceeding”), aff’d sub nom. J.D. 
Realty Assocs. v. Scoullar, 650 N.Y.S. 2d 67, 68 (N.Y. App. Term 1996). 
 79. Under New York law, a landlord may bring an Article 7 proceeding to recover possession 
from a tenant if the tenant has defaulted on rent and if “a demand of the rent has been made, or at 
least three days’ notice in writing requiring, in the alternative, the payment of the rent, or the 
possession of the premises, has been served upon him.”  N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711(2) 
(McKinney 1979).  The summary proceeding to recover possession cannot begin unless the landlord 
has served his statutory notice.  Romea, 163 F.3d at 116.  In Romea, such a notice was a 
“communication” because it conveyed information about the debt, even though the legal proceeding 
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When a communication occurs within the context of enforcing a lien, 
the FDCPA should still apply once a debt collector is trying to collect a 
debt.  In Piper v. Portnoff Law Associates, Ltd.,80 the defendant argued 
for exemption from the FDCPA because it was merely trying to enforce a 
lien for the consumer’s water bills.81  The only problem was that the 
defendant had already sent out several collection letters that demanded 
payment and had advised the consumers that their failure to pay could 
result in a sheriff’s sale of their property.82  Only after the consumers 
failed to pay was a lien placed on their property.83  The defendant 
believed that its decision to execute on the lien, rather than seek a 
personal judgment against the consumers, took the transaction out of the 
scope of the FDCPA.84 
There was no doubt that the defendant’s communications with the 
consumers were in connection with the collection of a debt, for every 
letter the defendant sent to the consumers requested payment of the water 
bills.85  The defendant had even accepted partial payment in satisfaction 
of the outstanding debt, and its sole business was to collect similar 
claims.  By throwing a lien into the mix, the defendant had hoped to 
convince the court that it was not really a debt collector, because it was 
only enforcing a lien, rather than collecting a debt.  It is true that a person 
whose principal business is the enforcement of security interests is 
                                                                                                                                  
had not yet commenced.  Id.; see also Kara B. Schissler, Note, Come and Knock on Our Door: The 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s Intrusion Into New York’s Summary Proceedings Law, 22 
CARDOZO L. REV. 315, 331–33 (2001) (summarizing the details of Romea). 
 80. 396 F.3d 227 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 81. Id. at 234. 
 82. Id. at 229–30. 
 83. Id. at 230. 
 84. Id. at 231–32. 
 85. Id. at 233.  The defendant’s testimony gave some idea of what the defendant was trying to 
accomplish: 
 Q. Let me pick up on that.  You are not looking for payments from the real estate but 
payments from these individuals, is that correct? 
 A. That is correct.  It is my—the record owners of the real estate would pay their 
delinquent tax and water bills. 
 Q. If they tendered personal checks, are they accepted? 
 A. Yes. 
   . . . . 
 Q. Your hope is to get the persons, the individuals to pay the money? 
 A. Right.  Our hope is that they pay as soon as possible in fact. 
 Q. You are not looking to liquidate the real property, but the payment from the 
individuals? 
 A. That is correct. 
Id.  The mere fact that the letters to the consumer preceded the enforcement of a lien did not change 
the nature of the “communication.”  Id. at 233–34; see also Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 
F.3d 379, 401 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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treated as a debt collector only for purposes of § 1692f(6),86 but in Piper, 
the defendant was engaged in other activity that qualified it as a 
collector, and it could not, therefore, be forgiven for not complying with 
other sections of the FDCPA.87 
Similar ambiguities arise in real estate transactions.  When a trustee 
forecloses on a trust deed, he does not bring himself within the 
FDCPA.88  The FDCPA is intended to curb abusive and deceptive 
collection practices when a collector tries to recover funds from a debtor.  
In such a foreclosure, a lender is merely trying to foreclose its interest in 
the property.89  When a trustee exercises his power of sale under a trust 
deed, he is not enforcing the obligation against the consumer 
personally.90  Therefore, the foreclosure of the property is not the 
collection of a debt within the meaning of the statute.91  However, when 
the proceeding is not a foreclosure pursuant to a trust deed, but is instead 
a judicial foreclosure under a mortgage, the FDCPA does apply.92  In the 
latter case, the collector usually seeks judgment on the note, and thus it is 
different from the nonjudicial sale where the trustee’s interest is in 
pursuing the property, from which he hopes to satisfy the debt. 
Even when a deed of trust is involved, it is possible that a trustee’s 
conduct may subject the transaction to the FDCPA.  There was a recent 
                                                     
 86. Section 1692a(6) provides that “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6) . . . such term [debt 
collector] also includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails 
in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.”  15 U.S.C. § 
1692a(6) (2000).  Section 1692f(6) then makes it an unfair practice for such a debt collector to take 
nonjudicial action to repossess property under certain circumstances.  15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) (2000). 
 87. Piper, 396 F.3d at 236.  Section 1692a(6) recognizes the specialty of the repossession 
agency, which does not extend to the daily communication with debtors in order to recover a debt.  
Id.  Such agencies are not subject to the FDCPA except for § 1692f(6).  See, e.g., Goldstein v. 
Chrysler Fin. Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (holding that “skip tracing firm” was 
not a “debt collector”); Seibel v. Soc’y Lease, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 713, 716 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding 
that a respossession agency is not a “debt collector” except for the purpose of § 1692f(6)); Jordan v. 
Kent Recovery Servs., 731 F. Supp. 652, 659 (D. Del. 1990) (same). 
 88. See Bergs v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P., No. 3:01-CV-1572-L, 2003 WL 22255679, 
at *6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2003) (foreclosure not debt collection under FDCPA); Hulse v. Ocwen 
Fed. Bank, FSB, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1204 (D. Or. 2002) (same); Heinemann v. Jim Walter 
Homes, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 716, 722 (N.D. W. Va. 1998) (same), aff’d, 173 F.3d 850 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
 89. Hulse, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 1204. 
 90. See Beadle v. Haughey, No. 04-272-SM, 2005 WL 300060, at *3 (D.N.H. Feb. 9, 2005) 
(distinguishing McDaniel v. South & Assocs., P.C., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1217–18 (D. Kan. 2004)). 
 91. Hulse, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 1204; Heinemann, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 722. 
 92. McDaniel, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1217–18.  But cf. Rosado v. Taylor, 324 F. Supp. 2d 917, 926 
(N.D. Ind. 2004) (holding the FDCPA did not apply to the summons and complaint seeking judical 
foreclosure, but did apply to the “FDCPA notice” sent to the debtor with the summons and 
complaint).  See generally NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 33, § 4.2.5 (discussing FDCPA 
applicability to foreclosure companies). 
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example of this in Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C.,93 when the 
Fourth Circuit decided that the trustee’s activities under a deed of trust 
fell within the statute despite the commencement of foreclosure 
proceedings.94 
It was understandable that the court in Wilson did not exempt this 
transaction from the statute since the defendants not only notified the 
consumer about a default in payment, but also indicated that they were 
doing so pursuant to the FDCPA.95  The defendants then proceeded to 
include the usual validation notice which gave specific information about 
the debt, while advising the consumer about the opportunity to dispute 
the debt.96  But the notice did not end there, for the defendants assured 
the consumer that they were attempting to collect a debt,97 while at the 
same time denying that they were debt collectors.98 
The defendants were obviously trying to straddle the fence by 
nudging the consumer into paying, instead of merely enforcing the 
security interest.  If there was any doubt about the defendants’ strategy, it 
was dispelled by the defendants’ last letter to the consumer that gave the 
amount required to reinstate the account and directed the consumer to 
send in a cashier’s check payable to the lender for the amount due.99  
Despite their denial, the defendants gave every indication that they were 
trying to collect a debt, as evidenced by the inclusion of a validation 
notice in their communication with the consumer and their own 
admission of their collection activity.100 
The message inherent in the Wilson decision is that the enforcement 
of a lien or a foreclosure under a deed of trust does not convert a true 
debt collector into a mere enforcer of a security interest.101  One must 
                                                     
 93. 443 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 94. Id. at 376. 
 95. Id. at 374. 
 96. Id. at 375.  The validation notice gives the consumer basic information about the debt and 
explains what the debt collector must do if the consumer disputes the debt within thirty days after 
receiving the debt collector’s notice.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2000). 
 97. Wilson, 443 F.3d at 374. 
 98. Id. at 375. 
 99. Id.  This letter also indicated that the defendants were attempting to collect a debt.  The 
defendant must have been motivated by the statutory requirement that the collector should indicate 
in its initial communication that it is trying to collect a debt.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2000) 
(describing statutory requirements).  However, this was not the initial communication. 
 100. Wilson, 443 F.3d at 374–75. 
 101. A person whose principal business is the enforcement of a security interest is a debt 
collector only for purposes of § 1692f(6) of the FDCPA.  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2000).  But if that 
person regularly collects debts for someone else, that person is subject to all provisions of the 
FDCPA and cannot escape coverage simply because he is also engaged in foreclosures.  Id.  The § 
1692f(6) restriction applies only to those “whose only role in the debt collection process is the 
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look at the whole picture to make a determination.102  Cases like Wilson 
simply underscore the fact that a trustee’s ability to recover a debt, or any 
part thereof, through a nonjudical sale, in no way restricts the trustee in 
pursuing the consumer with presale demands.103  It is this combination 
that poses problems for a trustee under a deed of trust because, as Wilson 
suggests, a trustee cannot engage in traditional collection activity and 
then seek refuge in a nonjudicial sale.104 
III. FALSE, DECEPTIVE, OR MISLEADING REPRESENTATIONS 
“A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading 
representation” to collect a debt.105  Although § 1692e uses this general 
standard to control a debt collector’s activities, the statute also includes, 
without limitation, sixteen categories of prohibited conduct.106  The 
FDCPA builds on the concept of deception developed in the FTC Act,107 
and the courts continue to support the proposition that it is sufficient to 
show that a debt collector’s conduct has a tendency to deceive and that 
actual deception is not necessary to show a violation.108  This approach 
                                                                                                                                  
enforcement of a security interest.”  Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378 (citing Jordan v. Kent Recovery Servs., 
Inc., 731 F. Supp. 652, 657 (D. Del. 1990)); see also Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 
693, 699 (6th Cir. 2003) (enforcer of security interest does not meet definition of debt collector, 
except for purposes of § 1692f(6)); Rosado v. Taylor, 324 F. Supp. 2d 917, 924 (N.D. Ind. 2004) 
(“[E]nforcing a security interest is not debt collection.”); Seibel v. Soc’y Lease, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 
713, 717 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (repossession agency falls within FDCPA only when it is enforcing a 
security interest). 
 102. Compare Fong v. Prof’l Foreclosure Corp., No. CO5-448JLR, 2005 WL 3134059, at *2 
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 22, 2005) (trustee pursuing foreclosure under a deed of trust is not debt 
collector), and Gonzalez v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc., No. Civ. 05-6081-AA, 2005 WL 2297097, at *1 (D. 
Or. Sept. 20, 2005) (same), and Hulse v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1211 (D. 
Or. 2002) (same), with Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 376 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(trustee’s conduct related to the collection of debt), and Piper v. Portnoff Assocs., 396 F.3d 227, 234 
(3d Cir. 2005) (law firm was debt collector even though debt was secured by lien), and Shapiro & 
Meinhold v. Zartman, 823 P.2d 120, 124 (Colo. 1992) (attorneys not exempt from FDCPA simply 
because their collection activities were primarily limited to foreclosures). 
 103. 443 F.3d at 374–75. 
 104. The court recognized that the “Defendants’ October 15 letter to Wilson contained a specific 
request for money to ‘reinstate the above account’ even after the foreclosure proceedings began.”  
Id. at 375.  The court construed this language as an attempt to collect a debt.  Id.; see also Fourth 
Circuit Holds FDCPA Applies to Foreclosure Law Firm, 24 NCLC REPORTS: DEBT COLLECTION 
AND REPOSSESSIONS EDITION 22 (May/June 2006) (discussing this interpretation). 
 105. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2000). 
 106. Section 1692e lists sixteen categories of false, deceptive, or misleading representations 
“[w]ithout limiting the general application” of the statute to prohibited conduct.  Id. 
 107. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).  The FTC Act declares “[u]nfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce . . . [to be] 
unlawful.”  Id. § 45(a)(1). 
 108. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 139 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he 
test is the capacity of the statement to mislead; evidence of actual deception is unnecessary.”); Jeter 
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lends credibility to the notion that a debt collector may still be liable if it 
employs a literally true statement that turns out to be deceptive because 
of a misleading implication.109  It is conceivable, therefore, for a debt 
collector to violate the statute if it fails to make affirmative disclosures 
which are necessary “to avoid the deceptive implication of a 
statement.”110  In construing § 1692e, the courts take a liberal approach 
by applying an objective standard of deception to the “least 
sophisticated”111 or the “unsophisticated” consumer.112  Therefore, a 
                                                                                                                                  
v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1175 (11th Cir. 1985) (discussing the “tendency to mislead” 
standard of deception); see also Kevin W. Brown, Annotation, What Constitutes False, Deceptive, or 
Misleading Representation or Means in Connection With Collection of Debt Proscribed by 
Provisions of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 USCS § 1692e), 67 A.L.R. FED. 974 (1984 & 
Supp. 2005) (discussing the tests courts use to “measure whether particular conduct is deceptive or 
misleading”). 
 109. See Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 227 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that a letter containing 
technically true but misleading statements violated the FDCPA); Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 
27 F.3d 1254, 1258 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Gradisher v. Check Enforcement Unit, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 
2d 907, 917 n.3 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (same); Faust v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc. (In re Faust), 270 
B.R. 310, 319 (M.D. Ga. 1998) (same); Weiss v. Collection Ctr., Inc., 667 N.W.2d 567, 572 (N.D. 
2003) (same). 
 110. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 33, § 5.5.2.5, at 150; see also Gammon, 27 F.3d 
at 1257 (holding that consumer might infer that debt collector was affiliated with government 
because collector had stated that it had provided the systems used in collecting taxes); Drennan v. 
Van Ru Credit Corp., 950 F. Supp. 858, 859 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (claim stated where defendant 
mentioned “legal review notification” and “notice of possible wage garnishment” but took no action 
for more than one year); Dutton v. Wolhar, 809 F. Supp. 1130, 1141 (D. Del. 1992) (holding that 
language “once judgment is obtained” falsely misrepresented debt collector’s ability to get a 
judgment), aff’d sub nom. Dutton v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 5 F.3d 649 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 111. See Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., 135 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 1998) (courts apply objective 
test based on understanding of the “least sophisticated consumer”); Bentley v. Great Lakes 
Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1993) (same); Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 869 
F.2d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 1988) (least sophisticated consumer test applies to threats of legal action); 
see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 33, § 5.5.2.5, at 150 (discussing least 
sophisticated consumer test). 
  In Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993), the court explained the purpose of the 
least sophisticated consumer test: 
  The basic purpose of the least sophisticated consumer standard is to ensure that the 
FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd. 
  . . . . 
  To serve the purposes of the consumer-protection laws, courts have attempted to 
articulate a standard for evaluating deceptiveness that does not rely on assumptions about 
the “average” or “normal” consumer.  This effort is grounded, quite sensibly, in the 
assumption that consumers of below-average sophistication or intelligence are especially 
vulnerable to fraudulent schemes. 
Id. at 1318–19. 
  Most courts have applied the least sophisticated consumer standard to the FDCPA in other 
contexts.  See Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1996) (using “least sophisticated 
consumer” standard to determine violation of § 1652g); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (same); Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 409 (4th Cir. 1999) (upholding application 
of “least sophisticated debtor” standard to § 1652g action); Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 
1025, 1028–29 (6th Cir. 1992) (same); Johnson v. Eaton, 873 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (M.D. La. 1995) 
(“least sophisticated consumer or debtor standard” is used in determining violations of § 1652g), 
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collector cannot be exonerated on the basis of the truth of its statement if 
that statement is subject to more than one interpretation, one of which 
has the capacity to deceive.113 
A. The Attorney’s Role 
One way in which a debt collector may intimidate a consumer is by 
giving the impression that a communication has come from an 
attorney.114  That strategy is designed to strike fear in the heart of the 
consumer so that the consumer will respond promptly to the demand for 
payment.  In Clomon v. Jackson, for example, a collection agency used 
an attorney’s letterhead to send out letters with a facsimile signature of 
the attorney as general counsel of NCB Collection Services.115  The use 
of the letterhead and the signature was intended to give the impression 
                                                                                                                                  
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 80 F.3d 148 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 112. In Gammon, the court expressed some dissatisfaction with the “least sophisticated 
consumer” standard and opted instead for the “unsophisticated consumer” test.  27 F.3d at 1257.  
The court explained its preference this way: 
  [W]e will use the term, “unsophisticated,” instead of the phrase, “least sophisticated,” 
to describe the hypothetical consumer whose reasonable perceptions will be used to 
determine if collection messages are deceptive or misleading.  We reiterate that an 
unsophisticated consumer standard protects the consumer who is uninformed, naive, or 
trusting, yet it admits an objective element of reasonableness.  The reasonableness 
element in turn shields complying debt collectors from liability for unrealistic or peculiar 
interpretations of collection letters. 
Id.  A little later, the Seventh Circuit explained in Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 227 (7th Cir. 1996), 
that Gammon did not “significantly change the substance of the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ 
standard as it had been routinely applied by courts.”  The court concluded that “the unsophisticated 
consumer standard is a distinction without much of a practical difference in application.”  Id.; see 
also Peters v. Gen. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 277 F.3d 1051, 1055 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that a violation 
of § 1692e must be “viewed through the eyes of an unsophisticated consumer”). 
 113. See Nat’l Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d at 138 (finding that collector’s mass mailings implied that 
attorney had reviewed files and decided that consumer would be subject to suit); Clomon, 988 F.2d 
at 1320–21 (holding that language in collection letter sufficient to create false impression that 
attorney had reviewed files); Gradisher, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 915–17 (holding that notice which stated 
“failure to Make Payment Can Result in a Warrant for Your Arrest” would lead a consumer to the 
false conclusion that he would be prosecuted if he did not pay); Wolhar, 809 F. Supp. at 1141 
(stating that consumer is not responsible for deciding between two possible interpretations); NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 33, § 5.5.2.5.6.1, at 153 (discussing case law). 
 114. The FDCPA prohibits “[t]he false representation or implication that any individual is an 
attorney or that any communication is from an attorney.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) (2000); see, e.g., 
Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand, 103 F.3d 1232, 1238 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding creditor 
liable as debt collector for using letterhead and facsimile signature of lawyer not participating in 
collection process); United States v. Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 370, 379 (N.D. 
Tex. 1986) (debt collector violated statute by using form “attorney letters”), aff’d as modified, 823 
F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1987); see also FTC Staff Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,105 (“A debt 
collector may not send a collection letter from a ‘Pre-Legal Department,’ where no legal department 
exists”). 
 115. 988 F.2d at 1316. 
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that the letters came from an attorney.116  Unfortunately, this was a false 
and misleading representation because the attorney did not review the 
debtor’s file and did not even see the collection letters before they were 
mailed.117  In no sense, therefore, could it be said that the letters were 
from an attorney.  Yet the letters stated that the attorney was suggesting 
that certain measures be taken “to further implement the collection of 
[the] seriously past due account.”118  The attorney had played no role in 
trying to collect the consumer’s debt, thus confirming the false 
representation about the origin of the collection letter.119  It was also 
clear that the mass mailing in this case constituted a false, deceptive, or 
misleading communication.120 
An attorney who wants to use the power of his position to elicit a 
consumer’s response must be personally and directly involved in the 
collection process if he hopes to avoid liability under § 1692e.121  It is 
evident that an attorney’s letter is more likely to catch the consumer’s 
attention, and it is this reality that leads to the collaboration between the 
creditor and the attorney.  There is nothing inherently wrong with such 
an alliance, but the parties must be careful not to leave the impression 
that an attorney is intimately involved with the file if in fact he merely 
lends his name to the transaction as if it were just a legal endorsement. 
It was well nigh an impossibility for the attorney in Avila v. Rubin122 
to review 270,000 letters annually, and yet all those letters went out on 
an attorney’s letterhead.123  This achievement may be evidence of the 
economic efficiency of the mass-mailing strategy, but the technique 
employed to attain that objective falls within the false, deceptive, or 
                                                     
 116. Id. at 1320. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1317. 
 119. The court made its point as follows: “[T]he fact that Jackson played virtually no day-to-day 
role in the debt collection process supports the conclusion that the collection letters were not ‘from’ 
Jackson in any meaningful sense of that word.”  Id. at 1320; see also Nielsen v. Dickerson, 307 F.3d 
623, 635 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[The attorney], as a legal professional, was not involved in . . . the debt 
collection process in any meaningful sense.”). 
 120. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1321. 
 121. See, e.g., Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 306 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(requiring that an attorney actually have participated in the collection process); Boyd v. Wexler, 275 
F.3d 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that reasonable jury could infer that the volume of collection 
letters prevented attorney from reviewing them); Russey v. Rankin, 911 F. Supp. 1449, 1458 
(D.N.M. 1995) (finding an attorney liable under § 1692e for cursorily signing collection letter); 
Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., 759 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (finding collector’s 
use of attorney form letter not only violated § 1692e but was also unfair and unconscionable under § 
1692f). 
 122. 84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 123. Id. at 225. 
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misleading category included in § 1692e.124  This is so because in an 
Avila-type case, an attorney has no time to review the files and has no 
real professional involvement in the transactions.  The demand for the 
exercise of such professional judgment does not in any way detract from 
the importance of paralegals or other legal assistants,125 but the point here 
is that an attorney cannot delegate his professional judgment to others 
just to set production records by accelerating the collection process. 
In Nielsen v. Dickerson,126 the attorney knew the identities of the 
consumers who were to receive the collection letters, but the letters were 
still form letters containing only basic information about the debt.127  The 
attorney’s most serious involvement related to verifying whether 
delinquent debtors had already filed bankruptcy and screening out 
debtors in certain states.128  The attorney had no authority to engage the 
debtor in a payment plan or to take legal action to recover the debt.129  
Like the attorney in Avila, the Nielsen attorney lent his name to the 
transaction as a convenient way of pressuring the consumer into 
compliance.130  It is not sufficient for an attorney simply to use a form 
letter without exercising his independent professional judgment in the 
collection process.131  The mailing of computer-generated form letters 
bearing an attorney’s facsimile-stamped signature does little to inspire 
confidence about the attorney’s professional role, although it may have  
 
                                                     
 124. The form letters in Avila were “mass-produced and . . . mechanically signed ‘Albert G. 
Rubin’ under his ‘attorney’ letterhead.”  Id. at 228.  In the year before the lawsuit was filed, 270,000 
of the mass-produced letters went out to consumers.  Id.  The argument for economic efficiency did 
not impress the Avila court because the attorney did not form any professional judgment about the 
cases involved.  Id.  A similar situation prompted the court in Clomon v. Jackson to make the 
following point: 
It is apparent that mass mailing may sometimes be the only feasible means of contacting 
a large number of delinquent debtors, particularly when many of those debtors owe 
relatively small sums.  But it is also true that the FDCPA sets boundaries within which 
debt collectors must operate.  No mass mailing technique is permissible—regardless of 
how effective it might be—if that technique constitutes a false, deceptive, or misleading 
communication. 
988 F.2d at 1321. 
 125. In Avila, the defendants argued that holding the attorney liable would “condemn the use of 
paralegals and assistants in a law office.”  84 F.3d at 229.  The Avila court recognized that it was the 
lawyer’s duty to supervise a paralegal’s work.  Id. at 229–30. 
 126. 307 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 127. Id. at 636. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 638; see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 33, § 5.5.6, at 175 (discussing 
the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Nielsen v. Dickerson). 
 130. Nielsen, 307 F.3d at 638. 
 131. Id. 
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the effect of convincing the consumer that he must respond in some 
fashion if he hopes to avoid litigation.132 
An attorney may leave a false impression of his professional 
involvement by indicating that the account has been turned over to him 
for legal action.  That strategy is designed to convince the debtor that a 
collector has instructed its lawyer to take the debtor to court and that the 
time for discussion has expired.  In Schimmel v. Slaughter,133 William 
Slaughter was the general manager of Credit Bureau of Athens, but he 
was also an attorney at law.134  He thought he could get better results 
from the consumer by indicating in his collection letter that the account 
had been turned over to him for “suit purposes,” and by signing the letter 
in his capacity as “Attorney at Law.”135  Slaughter made it clear that he 
was writing “[a]s attorney for the Credit Bureau of Athens.”136  It did not 
take much to imagine that he wanted the debtor to infer that the account 
was now in the hands of an independent advocate who would try to win a 
judgment for his client.137  The reality was that “the account had not 
really been ‘turned over’ to [Slaughter],” for he was in fact the majority 
shareholder of Credit Bureau of Athens and could not retain himself.138  
It was a deception calculated to produce a response from the 
consumer.139 
There are variations in the deceptive strategy from time to time, but 
they invariably come back to the use of a name.  In Schimmel it was the 
“attorney at law” designation that was misleading to the debtor,140 but in 
Veillard v. Mednick141 there was no such designation, and the court still 
                                                     
 132. There was a similar scenario in Sonmore v. CheckRite Recovery Services, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 
2d 1128 (D. Minn. 2001), where the court set the stage: “The parties do not dispute that Jon Hawks 
did not personally know Plaintiffs, review their letters, or review their files before sending them debt 
collection letters.  The letters were computer generated form letters bearing a facsimile-stamp of Jon 
Hawks’ signature.”  Id. at 1135. 
 133. 975 F. Supp. 1357 (M.D. Ga. 1997). 
 134. Id. at 1360. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1362. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1362–63.  The consumer in Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1996), faced a 
similar situation and the court highlighted the rationale for the collector’s action: 
An unsophisticated consumer, getting a letter from an “attorney,” knows the price of 
poker has just gone up.  And that clearly is the reason why the dunning campaign 
escalates from the collection agency, which might not strike fear in the heart of the 
consumer, to the attorney, who is better positioned to get the debtor’s knees knocking. 
Id. at 229. 
 140. 975 F. Supp. at 1360. 
 141. 24 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
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found the letter misleading and deceptive.142  This time the letterhead 
used was “Richard M. Mednick and Associates” and the signature was 
“J. Dancer for Richard M. Mednick, Debt Collector.”143  The court 
thought that it would be unusual for someone who was not a lawyer to 
use the phrase “and Associates” in the debt collection business, and that 
an unsophisticated consumer could reasonably believe that he was 
therefore dealing with a law firm that was prepared to sue him on the 
debt.144  It was significant here that the word “attorney” appeared 
nowhere in the collection letter, and thus the defendant felt confident that 
it would have taken some sophistication for a debtor to conclude that the 
letter had come from a lawyer.145  In some sense, the defendant had a 
point, since it is not that unusual to have other professionals use the 
designation “and associates.”146  Nevertheless, the court was convinced 
that under the circumstances, a consumer would be justified in thinking 
that “Richard Medick and Associates [was] a law firm prepared to take 
legal action on the debt.”147 
In Rumpler v. Phillips & Cohen Associates, Ltd., a debtor was not 
successful when she tried to impress the court with a similar argument.148  
The court compared the case to Clomon v. Jackson and reminded the 
parties that unlike Clomon, where the letterhead identified the writer as 
“Attorney-at-Law,”149 the letterhead in Rumpler was for “Phillips & 
Cohen Associates, Ltd.,” and there was no attorney designation in the 
letter.150  The only hitch was that the author of the Rumpler letter had 
used the “Esq.” designation after his name, and the debtor thought that 
she could convince the court that this title was sufficient to indicate 
attorney status.151  It was not a bad try on the debtor’s part, but the 
letter’s author had also used the title “Executive Vice President” under 
his name, and the court was convinced that such a title had blunted the 
                                                     
 142. Id. at 869. 
 143. Id. at 865. 
 144. Id. at 867. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. 219 F. Supp. 2d 251, 255–57 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 149. Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1317 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 150. 219 F. Supp. 2d at 257.  In Zaborac v. Phillips & Cohen Associates, Ltd., 330 F. Supp. 2d 
962 (N.D. Ill. 2004), the signatory was “Adam S. Cohen, Esq.”  Id. at 969.  The court found the use 
of “Esq.” gratuitous and the unsophisticated consumer not likely to regard the “Esq.” designation as 
confusing.  Id. at 969–70; see also Tromba v. M.R.S. Assocs., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting in dictum that “Senior Legal Associate” was hardly the equivalent of 
“attorney at law”). 
 151. Rumpler, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 257. 
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effect of the “Esq.” designation.152  The letter in Grief v. Wilson, Elser, 
Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP153 was less objectionable because 
there was no mention of “Esq.” or “attorney” and no other indication that 
the letter had come from a lawyer.  There was no professional 
designation for the contact person identified in the letter, and the court 
was unpersuaded that there was a violation when such a person was 
merely identified as “Mr.”154 
B. The Meaning of Language 
A careful choice of language will usually keep a debt collector out of 
trouble.  For example, in Higgins v. Capitol Credit Services, Inc.,155 the 
collection letter stated that “[i]f [the Power of Attorney] is approved, it 
could result in an attachment of [the debtor’s] personal property and/or 
wages.”156  The debtor objected to this language on the ground that it 
“would mislead an unsophisticated debtor to believe that the approval of 
the Power of Attorney, without more, would cause attachment of his 
property or garnishment of his wages.”157 
It is understandable that the court was not sympathetic to the debtor’s 
plight in this context, for the language did not convey the message that 
approval of the power of attorney would lead to the legal remedies 
mentioned in the collection letter.158  The court explained “that the least 
sophisticated debtor understands that the phrase ‘could result in’ 
connotes a possible future occurrence and not an inexorable certainty.”159  
The debt collector did not have to go into detail on how it would 
accomplish the attachment or garnishment if it came to that.160  There 
was a difference between “could” and “would,” and the collector’s use of 
                                                     
 152. Id.; see also Zaborac, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 969–70 (finding that the consumer did not meet 
burden of showing that an unsophisticated consumer would find use of “Esq.” confusing).  The 
designation in Rumpler was a little different from that in Clomon, where the collection letter 
identified the sender as “P.D. Jackson, Attorney at Law, General Counsel, NCB Collection 
Services.”  Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1317 (emphasis omitted).  In that case, the least sophisticated 
consumer could not be criticized for believing that Jackson was acting as a lawyer.  Id. at 1320–21. 
 153. 217 F. Supp. 2d 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 154. Id. at 341–42.  The court explained: “The firm stationary [sic], on which the letter is 
written, does not include the names of attorneys or other firm personnel.  As such, the least 
sophisticated consumer would not match Mr. DeGaetano’s name to the name of an attorney in the 
firm.”  Id. 
 155. 762 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Del. 1991). 
 156. Id. at 1138 (first two alterations in original). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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the former term merely sent a message about the possibilities that lay 
ahead if the debtor continued his delinquency.161 
In another case, the debt collector was not as careful with its message 
when it promised to release all liens when it received payment.162  One 
might logically ask why the collector referred to the release of 
nonexisting liens.  In fact, the jury in Dutton found that the least 
sophisticated consumer could be misled into thinking that liens already 
existed on the property.163  The collector could not wiggle its way out of 
this predicament by underscoring its ability to obtain a lien if a judgment 
remained unsatisfied.164  There was nothing deceptive about identifying 
the available tools that might be available to the collector, but the bald 
assertion about releasing all liens once the debtor paid presupposed the 
existence of a lien.165  That is exactly the message the collector wanted to 
send, but in doing so, it used deceptive means to accomplish its 
objective. 
At first blush, certain language does not seem to present a problem 
when taken in the abstract, but when it is put in context it can lead to 
more than one meaning.  In Peters v. General Service Bureau, Inc.,166 the 
debt collector’s voluntary appearance letter stated that “if [the debtor] did 
not consent within five days, to appear voluntarily, the agency’s ‘only 
alternative’ would be to request personal service by a city constable at 
his residence or place of employment.”167  What was the meaning of 
“only alternative” in this context?  The debtor argued that the statement 
was literally false because the local law also allowed service by certified 
mail or authorized agent.168  So the debtor’s view was that the agency 
had other alternatives.  On the other hand, the collector alleged that there 
was no viable alternative because service by certified mail was costly 
and did not produce the desired results.169  The court solved the problem 
by rejecting the contention that the collector’s statement was literally 
false, because the statement did not say that service by constable was 
                                                     
 161. Id.  The court recognized that “[e]ven the least sophisticated debtor would take the 
statement in the May 10 letter to mean that failure to pay his debt might lead to garnishment of his 
wages or attachment of his property.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 162. Dutton v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 5 F.3d 649, 657 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. at 657 (finding “merely that it could occur” is different from stating that it had 
occurred); see also Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 571 (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining that a 
collector falsely represented legal status of debt by implying that the case was already in litigation). 
 166. 277 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 167. Id. at 1053. 
 168. Id. at 1054. 
 169. Id. at 1055. 
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“the only alternative under Nebraska law.”170  It observed that the 
unsophisticated consumer test was a practical one, and that “statements 
that are merely ‘susceptible of an ingenious misreading’ do not violate 
the FDCPA.”171 
It is not easy to appreciate the ingenuity of reading “only” to mean 
“only,” but it is perplexing that the court characterized the debtor’s 
reading as an “ingenious misreading” under the circumstances.172  The 
collector’s explanation of “only” led to the introduction of the adjective 
“viable” to qualify “alternative,” a formulation which did not appear in 
its letter to the consumer.173  The court went along happily with the debt 
collector’s position by suggesting that the debt collector would have 
failed the § 1692e test if it had advised the consumer that its only 
alternative under Nebraska law was service by a constable.174  This 
response is certainly not one that an unsophisticated consumer should be 
expected to make under the circumstances.  It is akin to asking the 
consumer to read between the lines or to consider the various 
possibilities inherent in the use of the term “only.”  It is evident that even 
when the courts make some allowance for the consumer’s lack of 
sophistication, they sometimes expect too much, and Peters is a good 
example of this phenomenon. 
Despite cases like Peters, the courts do try their level best to give 
meaning to a debt collector’s language.  When a debt collector informs a 
debtor that the debtor will be subject to certain costs even before the 
collector files an action, there is an implication that the debtor is going to 
                                                     
 170. Id. at 1056 (emphasis omitted). 
 171. Id. (citing White v. Goodman, 200 F.3d 1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that the 
description on the back of a collection letter of the rights of Colorado residents, as required by 
Colorado law, should not be read to mean that residents of other states do not have such rights)); see 
also Morse v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 901, 904 (D. Minn. 2000) (finding that the 
Colorado notice provision in a collection letter was not false or misleading). 
 172. Applying the unsophisticated consumer test, the court concluded that “statements that are 
merely ‘susceptible to an ingenious misreading’ do not violate the FDCPA.”  Peters, 277 F.3d at 
1056 (citing White, 200 F.3d at 1020).  One wonders what was so ingenious about how the debtor 
interpreted the collector’s language.  A consumer would have thought that his failure to act might 
have led to a police constable at his door. 
 173. The omission of the word “viable” in the collection phrase was sure to leave the impression 
that the collector had no choice.  So the consumer could either agree to appear voluntarily or face the 
prospect of a visit from a policeman. 
 174. See Peters, 277 F.3d at 1056 (stating that the letter would be false if it included the 
language “only alternative under Nebraska law”).  In Avila v. Rubin, the Seventh Circuit took the 
view that a literally false statement violates the FDCPA as a matter of law.  84 F.3d 222, 227 (7th 
Cir. 1996).  The Peters court did not want to go down this road because it stated that even assuming 
the falsity of the collector’s statement, the statement would not mislead the consumer.  See Peters, 
277 F.3d at 1056 (stating that even if the letter was deemed literally false “it would not mislead 
because it effectively conveys the consequences of failing to sign and return”). 
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lose his case because he will have no defense to the lawsuit.175  The 
insinuation here is that the debtor should give up promptly and avoid the 
sundry costs of defending an action that he cannot win.  This is what the 
debt collector depends on—the fear that costs to the debtor will 
inevitably ensue once the debt collector takes legal action.  In the same 
vein, if a debt collector refers to the possibility of garnishment after 
judgment is obtained, it leaves the debtor feeling that a judgment is 
inevitable, and it is this inevitability that is intended to prod the debtor 
into action.176  The debt collector hopes that a court will read this kind of 
language as merely indicating one of the avenues that will be available 
for enforcing a judgment once the debt collector obtains it.  But a 
consumer might be persuaded more by the inevitability of the outcome 
than by the possibilities inherent in the enforcement options, and this is 
what the FDCPA is designed to avoid. 
A debtor’s complaint about a debt collector’s language sometimes 
leaves a lot to be desired.  In Goswami v. American Collections 
Enterprise, Inc.,177 the collection letter contained a peculiar caption, 
“Settlement Offer & Amnesty Period.”178  The debtor went out on a limb 
and argued that the collector’s use of the term “amnesty” in this context 
was deceptive because it suggested that criminal proceedings were 
pending.179  The court did not agree with the consumer and tied the term 
“amnesty” instead to the collector’s offer of settlement.180  It was another 
                                                     
 175. See Gradisher v. Check Enforcement Unit, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 907, 914–17 (W.D. Mich. 
2002) (finding that notices from collector, which stated that nonpayment of bad checks would result 
in criminal prosecution, violated the FDCPA when collector had no authority to commence criminal 
action); Fuller v. Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., 192 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1369 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (finding 
defendant’s letter violated the FDCPA because an unsophisticated consumer would interpret it to 
mean “there was no chance in prevailing once a lawsuit was filed”); Spencer v. Henderson-Webb, 
Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 582, 591 (D. Md. 1999) (explaining that an attempt to collect other costs 
violates the FDCPA); Johnson v. Eaton, 873 F. Supp. 1019, 1024–25 (M.D. La. 1995) (“[T]he least 
sophisticated debtor would be induced to overlook and disregard his statutory right to dispute and 
verify the debt within 30 days.”). 
 176. See Schimmel v. Slaughter, 975 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (M.D. Ga. 1997) (stating that an 
unsophisticated debtor who received a letter from a lawyer using the words, “after judgment is 
obtained” would likely interpret it to mean there was no chance of prevailing, thus finding the 
language violated § 1692e(10)); Dutton v. Wolhar, 809 F. Supp. 1130, 1141 (D. Del. 1992) (finding 
that the “once judgment is obtained” language violated the FDCPA), aff’d sub nom. Dutton v. 
Wolpoff & Abramson, 5 F.3d 649 (3d Cir. 1993).  In Gostony v. Diem Corp., the collector escaped 
liability although it threatened to file a lawsuit “and/or” garnish wages.  The court did not view the 
threat as falsely implying that the collector had a present intent to garnish the consumer’s wages 
before even filing suit.  Gostony v. Diem Corp., 320 F. Supp. 2d 932, 941 (D. Ariz. 2003). 
 177. 377 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 331 (2005). 
 178. Id. at 492. 
 179. Id. at 494–95. 
 180. The court stated that “[t]he ‘amnesty’ reference clearly refers to the debt forgiveness offer 
in the body of the letter and consumers, even unsophisticated consumers, would not believe 
 
GRIFFITH FINAL.DOC 1/12/2007  2:52:22 PM 
2006] THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNICATING 89 
attempt by a debtor to introduce a meaning that supported his allegation 
of deceit, although the collection language itself bore no relation to the 
debtor’s interpretation of the heading.  The debtor opted for a message 
that was designed to gain sympathy for him, although another meaning 
was plainly more relevant to his situation. 
Even when one allegation seems hopeless, another may carry the 
day.  So when the debt collector in Goswami misled the debtor into 
thinking that the creditor had limited the settlement offer to thirty days, 
the court found a violation of § 1692e.181  The debt collector obviously 
had a strategy to goad the debtor into paying before time expired, even 
though the creditor had authorized the debt collector to give the debtor a 
discount at any time.182  It is true that the debtor must have been grateful 
for any possibility of a discount, but this did not give the debt collector 
license to mislead him. 
Even though courts are generally well disposed towards settlement 
offers, they are not keen on giving a debt collector the leeway to deceive 
the consumer.183  The policy behind encouraging settlement offers is to 
resolve collection problems without the usual costs associated with a 
lawsuit.  But this should not mean settlement at all costs, and the FDCPA 
does not grant the debt collector free rein to do as it pleases, all in the 
name of promoting its settlement strategy.  When a debt collector urges a 
debtor to pay the amount demanded in order “‘to avoid the remedies 
available under the . . . State laws,’”184 that should give the debtor some 
clue about what the collector has in mind.  But when the debt collector 
indicates in the same letter that it is making its “final demand” before it 
takes “‘such actions,’”185 the debtor should really begin to worry.  Some 
                                                                                                                                  
otherwise.”  Id. at 495.  Settlement offers are consistent with the purpose of the FDCPA.  See Lewis 
v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 399 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that “[a]llowing debt collectors 
to send such a letter [containing a settlement offer] is not only consistent with the Act but also may 
result in resolution of the debt without resorting to litigation”). 
 181. 377 F.3d at 495–96.  The collection letter misled the consumer with the following language: 
“Effective immediately, and only during the next thirty days, will our client agree to settle your 
outstanding balance due with a thirty percent (30%) discount off your above balance owed.”  Id. at 
492. 
 182. Id. at 495. 
 183. See id. at 496 (“While we agree that it is important to permit collection agencies to offer 
settlements, that policy consideration does not remove collection agencies’ obligation under the 
FDCPA to deal in a nondeceitful manner.”); Buzoiu v. Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., No. 03-3579, 
2003 WL 22938052, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2003) (collector’s motion to dismiss denied where 
language about one-time offer was not clear); Jones v. Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., No. 02-C-
9392, 2003 WL 21654365, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2003) (class action certified where consumer 
alleged that collector’s offer was not really one-time offer). 
 184. Herbert v. Monterey Fin. Servs., Inc., 863 F. Supp. 76, 78 (D. Conn. 1994) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 185. Id. at 79. 
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debt collectors do not really intend their initial letter to be a final 
demand, although they may want the debtor to think so.  Inevitably there 
is a follow-up letter, giving the debtor another few days to respond 
before the debt collector makes a final decision.  This sequence is usually 
a carefully planned strategy to keep pressure on the debtor.  It was the 
tactic that the debt collector used in Herbert186 to no great advantage, for 
the court recognized the collector’s statement as “objectively false” and 
thus a violation of § 1692e.187  The consumer was supposed to think that 
the debt collector was giving her one last chance before it acted, except 
that the “final demand” was not really final since it was followed by 
another communication that advised the debtor about a pending final 
decision.188 
The debtor in Kimbro v. I.C. System, Inc.189 tried to use Herbert to 
bolster her claim of falsehood when the debt collector made an offer of 
settlement that was supposed to expire within ten days.190  But there was 
a different situation in Kimbro.191  Unlike Herbert, there was no “final 
demand,” no indication of a one-time offer, and no threat of legal 
action.192  The debtor in Kimbro was unable to show that the debt 
collector would not honor its promise of a discount if the consumer paid 
within ten days or a reasonable period thereafter.193  There was also no 
evidence that the debt collector would reject the debtor’s attempts to 
arrange a payment plan if the debtor could not pay off the debt 
immediately.194  The debtor could hardly prove that the collector’s 
statement was false under these circumstances. 
C. The Amount of the Debt 
A debt collector can easily misstate the amount of the debt that the 
consumer owes by including costs and fees not yet due.  This can be a 
winning strategy for the debt collector if the consumer is overwhelmed 
by the prospect of facing an inflated debt, for then he may succumb to 
the collector’s demands.  When the FDCPA enjoins the debt collector 
from misrepresenting the “character, amount, or legal status” of the 
                                                     
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 80. 
 188. Id. at 78–79. 
 189. 336 F. Supp. 2d 188 (D. Conn. 2004). 
 190. Id. at 190–91. 
 191. Id. at 192. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
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debt,195 it merely seeks to take away one of the weapons in the debt 
collector’s arsenal.  A debt collector’s misstatement of the amount of the 
debt may lead the consumer to settle for a reduced amount, thinking all 
the while that he is getting a bargain. 
The collector in Veach v. Sheeks196 knew full well what he was doing 
when he included in the amount of the debt legal penalties that a court 
had not yet awarded.197  What started out as a claim for $350 eventually 
increased to $1050, plus a reasonable attorney’s fee and court costs, and 
the attorney justified the figure on the basis of treble damages.198  The 
only problem was that a court had to enter a judgment for such damages, 
and the collector’s statement about such damages was premature.199  It 
was a misrepresentation of the debt.  The remedy of treble damages was 
a creature of statute, and the debt collector could not include it in the 
amount of the debt without judicial approval.200 
Even when a contract between the parties provides for costs and an 
attorney’s fee, a debt collector must still clearly identify the amount of 
the debt for the consumer’s benefit.  In Fields v. Wilber Law Firm,201 a 
debt that started out as $122.06 ended up eight months later as 
$388.54.202  The consumer alleged that the collection letters were 
misleading because the debt collector did not explain how the balance 
had reached that figure, even though the contract allowed for certain 
costs.203  The court concluded that the consumer had allegations 
sufficient to state a claim under § 1692e.204 
It is understandable that a court would look askance at this method of 
disclosure where the debt collector lumps all items together as the 
                                                     
 195. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) (2000). 
 196. 316 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 197. See id. at 694 (“[Collector] knew that [debtor] allegedly owed [creditor] $350 . . . [and] 
assum[ed] the outcome of future events in drafting his notice . . . .”). 
 198. Id. at 691–92. 
 199. See id. at 693 (“Since Veach cannot be held liable for treble damages, court costs, or 
attorney’s fees until there has been a judgment by a court, they cannot be part of the ‘remaining 
principal balance’ of a claimed debt.”) (emphasis added). 
 200. Id.  The collector in Veach tried to avoid liability by relying on the accuracy of the notice of 
claim and small claim summons.  Id.  However, another notice of claim contained the misleading 
information about the debt.  Id.  The court held that when there are two different versions of the 
amount of the debt, the communication may still violate the statute.  Id. (citing Johnson v. Revenue 
Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 201. 383 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 202. Id. at 563. 
 203. See id. at 563–64, 566 (“[Consumer] asserted that the collection letters . . . were misleading 
under § 1692e” because “[n]owhere did [collector] explain that it was seeking attorneys’ fees of 
$250.”). 
 204. Id. at 565–66. 
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account balance.  It was particularly disconcerting in Fields because the 
debt collector sent out the initial letter some eight months after the 
consumer allegedly had incurred the charges.205  After a time memories 
fade, and a consumer may be hard pressed to recall the details of the 
transaction.  He may just throw in the towel and pay off the “account 
balance” without understanding that it represents substantially more than 
the charges originally incurred.  In this context, the debt collector has 
ample opportunity to create a false impression about the character of the 
debt, and the FDCPA therefore imposes an obligation on the debt 
collector to reveal the details of the amount it is seeking.  The debt 
collector can fulfill its mission by itemizing the various charges so that 
there is no confusion about the character of the debt.206  While the debt 
collector in Fields was well within its rights to include an attorney’s fee 
within its claim in light of the contractual terms between the creditor and 
the consumer, the collector still had an independent duty to be forthright 
about the elements of the balance due.207  It was not enough for the debt 
collector to provide a telephone number for the consumer to call if he 
had any questions.208  The obligation to comply with the statute cannot 
be wiped out by merely establishing lines of communication between the 
parties.209 
The debt collector can also cause confusion for the consumer by 
listing the balance due as a certain amount plus interest and legal fees.  
Since the interest increases as the debt becomes more delinquent, the 
debt collector will wonder how it can disclose the interest as a part of the 
debt when it communicates with the consumer.  The collector should 
disclose the amount of the debt, including the interest due, as of the date 
of the collection letter.210  This will give the consumer a firm idea of the 
                                                     
 205. Id. at 563. 
 206. As the court said in Fields, “[i]t would be difficult for [an unsophisticated consumer] to 
understand how a relatively modest fee for services rendered had tripled in size.”  Id. at 566. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. (citing Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 
872, 875–76 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
 209. Id.; see also Miller, 214 F.3d at 875–76 (holding that mere listing of a phone number does 
not satisfy the FDCPA even when the amount of debt changes daily because the collector could 
“state the total amount due—interest and other changes as well as principal—on the date the dunning 
letter was sent”); Validation Notice—Disclosure of Amount of the Debt: Part II, 36 CONSUMER 
CREDIT AND TRUTH-IN-LENDING COMPLIANCE REPORT 3 (Earl Phillips ed. Dec. 2004) 
(summarizing the Fields holding). 
 210. Miller, 214 F.3d at 875–76.  The Seventh Circuit provided some safe-harbor language in 
Miller: 
  As of the date of this letter, you owe $___ [the exact amount due].  Because of 
interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due 
on the day you pay may be greater.  Hence, if you pay the amount shown above, an 
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amount due as of that date, and does not leave him guessing about that 
element. 
A reference to legal fees without an explanation can get a debt 
collector in trouble because a consumer will not usually owe any such 
fees when the debt collector sends its collection letter.  That was the 
problem in McDowall v. Leschack & Grodensky, P.C.,211 in which the 
debt collector stated the balance due plus “interest and attorney’s 
fees.”212  With respect to the attorney’s fees, the collector’s defense was 
that it had made no demand for legal fees, but had merely reminded the 
consumer of his contractual agreement to pay them.213  The court 
observed that the debt collector had listed the attorney’s fees as a part of 
the balance due, thus creating the impression that such fees were already 
a part of the debt.214  But such fees were not due when the debt collector 
sent out its letter, and the consumer could have been misled into thinking 
that she owed an amount well beyond that which could be enforced.215  
The debt collector thought that it would be forgiven for referring to legal 
fees if it used language later in the letter indicating that the consumer had 
agreed in the credit card agreement to pay a reasonable attorney’s fee.216  
The collector had already listed the attorney’s fees as part of the balance 
due, and a subsequent asterisk with a reference to the credit card 
agreement did not undo the damage already done by the confusing 
language.217 
Sometimes a consumer thwarts a debt collector’s litigation plans by 
paying the outstanding debt to avoid trial.  When the collector tries later 
                                                                                                                                  
adjustment may be necessary after we receive your check, in which event we will inform 
you before depositing the check for collection.  For further information, write the 
undersigned or call 1-800-[phone number]. 
Id. (alterations in original). 
 211. 279 F. Supp. 2d 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 212. Id. at 198 (internal citation omitted). 
 213. Id. at 200. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id.  In Person v. Stupar, Schuster & Cooper, S.C., 136 F. Supp. 2d 957 (E.D. Wis. 2001), 
the collection letter stated that the debtor owed “$987.71, plus attorney’s fees.”  Id. at 959.  The 
court held that it was not irrational or unrealistic to view the letter as meaning that the debtor owed a 
principal balance and “an indeterminate amount of attorney fees.”  Id. at 963.  The collectors sought 
refuge in the “safe-harbor” language of Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 501–02 (7th Cir. 1997), but 
that language did not include the phrase “plus attorney’s fees,” and the case essentially revolved 
around the consumer’s confusion under § 1692g rather than the collector’s deception under § 1692e.  
Person, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 963–64; see also Veach v. Sheeks, 316 F.3d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(finding collector liable for including in amount of debt legal penalties not yet awarded by court). 
 216. See McDowall, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 200 (rejecting the collectors’ argument that the 
collection letter did not demand attorney’s fees because it merely referred to the consumer’s prior 
agreement to pay reasonable attorney’s fees). 
 217. Id.  The collection letter did not clarify that the consumer did not owe any attorney’s fees at 
the time the letter was written.  Id. 
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to recover court costs, it may find an uncooperative debtor who questions 
the legitimacy of its claim.  One might wonder whether there can be 
court costs if there has been no trial.  The debtor in Shula v. Lawent218 
challenged whether he owed anybody for such costs when he had already 
paid his debt before entry of a judgment.219  If the court had awarded 
costs, they certainly would have become part of the debt.  But there was 
no such award in Shula, and the debtor was justified in querying the 
collectors’ claim as false and misleading.220 
The collection letter stated that the debtor owed the collectors for 
court costs,221 a claim that could hardly be justified under the 
circumstances without a court order.  In any event, the costs, if any, 
would have been due the creditor and not the collectors.  Thus the 
collectors’ assertion that the debtor owed them was inaccurate.  The 
collectors were really suing on behalf of the creditor, and their letter 
demanding that the debtor should pay them, because the debtor owed 
them, was false and misleading under § 1692e.222 
The debt collector has a duty to disclose to the debtor the amount of 
the debt, the current obligation, “not what the final, worst-case scenario 
could be.”223  It is, therefore, not a good strategy for a debt collector to 
include in the amount of the debt the various costs and penalties that 
might ensue after a judgment is obtained.224  From the collector’s 
perspective, the more items the collector can add to the debt, the greater 
the balance due will be.  This inflated figure will doubtless make an 
impression on the debtor.  A false representation of the amount of the 
debt is supposed to produce dividends for the debt collector, because it 
gives the collector some leeway in settling the debt for a lesser amount 
that may come close to what the collector hoped to recover anyway.  
Nevertheless, a collector’s strategy can backfire when the balance 
allegedly due greatly exceeds anything the debtor recognizes.  In Goins 
                                                     
 218. 359 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 219. Id. at 490–91. 
 220. Id. at 491. 
 221. Id. at 490. 
 222. Id. at 492. 
 223. Veach v. Sheeks, 316 F.3d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). 
 224. See id. (finding consumer not liable for court costs and attorney’s fees until judgment); 
Picht v. Jon R. Hawks, Ltd., 236 F.3d 446, 451 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that debt collector violated 
FDCPA by using prejudgment garnishment statute); Duffy v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 
2000) (holding that attempted recovery of attorney’s fees not permitted by state law violated 
FDCPA); Ballard v. Equifax Check Servs., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1177 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (holding 
that collector violated FDCPA by adding unauthorized service charge to dishonored check amount); 
Ditty v. CheckRite, Ltd., 973 F. Supp. 1320, 1330 (D. Utah 1997) (holding that collection agency 
violated FDCPA by collecting unauthorized service fee). 
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v. JBC & Associates, P.C.,225 the collection letter identified one creditor 
but associated twenty-two returned checks with the balance due that 
creditor, instead of only the two that were relevant.226  The letter 
therefore left the impression that the amount sought, $10,277.56, 
concerned only debts owed to the identified creditor, and nowhere 
indicated that the amount included debts owed to other merchants.227  
Furthermore, although the letter stated that the debtor might be subject to 
statutory penalties “as determined by the court,” the debt collector 
designated the balance as $10,277.56, which purported to include the 
potential statutory damages that were available under state law for 
returned checks.228  The inclusion of such damages for other checks, not 
related to the payee of the two checks in contention in Goins, amounted 
to false representation of the amount of the debt owed, and the debtor 
could not be faulted for complaining about the misleading nature of the 
communication.229 
D. Identifying the Purpose of the Communication 
It is also a violation if, in its initial communication, a debt collector 
does not disclose that it is trying to collect a debt and that it will use any 
information it obtains for that purpose.230  Subsequent communications 
need only indicate that the communication is from a debt collector and 
may exclude the other collection language required in the initial 
communication.231  Before the statute was amended in 1996,232 the debt 
collector had to include the § 1692e(11) language in all debt collection 
communications, including those with other parties besides the  
 
                                                     
 225. 352 F. Supp. 2d 262 (D. Conn. 2005). 
 226. Id. at 269. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id.  The collector really painted the worst-case scenario, and the requirement of stating the 
amount of the debt is intended to inform the debtor of his obligation only.  Id. (citing Veach, 316 
F.3d at 693). 
 230. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2000). 
 231. Id. 
 232. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2305, 110 
Stat. 3009, 3009–425 (1996). 
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consumer,233 but the amended statute is intended to regulate only 
communications with the consumer.234 
In fulfilling its obligation under § 1692e(11), a debt collector does 
not have to use the exact language contained in the statute, as long as it 
conveys the statutory message effectively.  The debt collector in Ross v. 
Commercial Financial Services, Inc.235 tried to make its letter more 
impressive by stating that it was a “‘different kind of debt collection 
company.’”236  Perhaps the collector sought some variation on the theme, 
but the court would not accept the debtor’s contention that the 
defendant’s language would mislead a consumer into thinking that the 
defendant was anything but a debt collector.237  The court’s reaction was 
that “[a] ‘debt collection company’ is a ‘debt collector’ in anyone’s 
vernacular.”238 
If a person’s contact with a consumer does not constitute an initial 
communication, then there is no need for the § 1692e(11) language to be 
included in a letter that merely inquires whether the consumer has filed 
for bankruptcy.  The defendant in Buckley v. Bass & Associates239 made 
a delicate inquiry about a “possible bankruptcy,” listing the creditor’s 
name and account number.240  It was not a demand for payment and did 
not indicate the amount of the debt.  But the defendant’s request for 
bankruptcy information was obviously intended to guide the defendant’s 
strategy, since the defendant was in the business of representing creditors 
                                                     
 233. Before the 1996 amendment, the § 1692e violation read as follows: 
  Except as otherwise provided for communications to acquire location information 
under section 1692b . . . , the failure to disclose clearly in all communications made to 
collect a debt or to obtain information about a consumer, that the debt collector is 
attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that 
purpose. 
15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (Supp. II 1979). 
 234. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2000) (outlining the requirement that the debt collector, in its 
first communication with the consumer, must inform the consumer of the purpose of the 
communication); see also Conboy v. AT & T Corp., 241 F.3d 242, 257 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that 
the plaintiffs had no claim under § 1692e because plaintiffs were not consumers); NAT’L CONSUMER 
LAW CTR., supra note 33, § 5.5.14.1, at 192 (explaining that the amended statute only imposed its 
requirements on communications with the consumer). 
 235. 31 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
 236. Id. at 1079. 
 237. See id. at 1080 (stating that “[c]oupled with the bold-faced statement that the letter is ‘an 
attempt to collect a debt,’ it is impossible to conclude that the letter is in any way misleading”). 
 238. Id. at 1079; see also Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 
1989) (not necessary to quote the § 1692e(11) language); Sandlin v. Shapiro & Fishman, 919 F. 
Supp. 1564, 1568 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (same); NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 33, § 5.5.14.1, 
at 191–92 & n.682 (discussing cases). 
 239. 249 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 240. Id. at 679. 
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in consumer bankruptcies.241  If the consumer had admitted in her 
response that she had filed for bankruptcy, the defendant would have 
known that it had to file a claim in bankruptcy or seek reaffirmation of 
the debt if it was secured.242  If the debtor had not filed, then presumably 
the defendant could have then sent a collection letter, for there would be 
no issue of an automatic stay.243 
In Buckley, the Seventh Circuit was not prepared to preclude 
inquiries which merely solicited information from the debtor about his 
bankruptcy status, and thus agreed with the defendant that the statute did 
not impose an obligation on the defendant to admit that it was trying to 
collect a debt, and that it would use any information obtained in the 
process for that purpose.244  Among the various blank spaces on the 
information sheet sent to the debtor was one regarding the debtor’s 
“intent.”  The court readily conceded that a consumer might read this 
inquiry about intent as an indirect demand for payment.245  If the 
defendant routinely sent this inquiry to every debtor without any basis 
for suspecting bankruptcy, such debtors might view the letter as a threat 
to force them into bankruptcy if they did not pay.246 
There were other possibilities, of course, foremost among them being 
that the defendant was only in the business of dealing with creditors’ 
claims in bankruptcy, rather than being in the collection business as such.  
If so, the defendant’s inquiry would not be a precursor to a collection 
letter, but rather to a claim in bankruptcy, which would fall outside the 
FDCPA.  The Seventh Circuit did not have to choose between these 
possibilities, for the debtor was looking for a declaration from the court 
that the defendant’s letter was, on its face, an initial communication 
which brought § 1692e(11) into play.247  This search for a per se rule of 
illegality was unsuccessful only because the court was unwilling to treat 
all inquiries about bankruptcy as an initial communication in connection 
                                                     
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 680 (citing Cox v. Zale Del., Inc., 239 F.3d 910, 912–13 (7th Cir. 2001)); see also 
Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 878–79 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing options for 
creditors whose debtors are in bankruptcy); Chase Automotive Fin., Inc. v. Kinion (In re Kinion), 
207 F.3d 751, 756 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing the purpose of reaffirmation in bankruptcy); In re 
Turner, 156 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 1998) (discussing reaffirmation). 
 243. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000) (providing for automatic stay). 
 244. See Buckley, 249 F.3d at 681 (“Given that a debt collector or other creditor’s agent has a 
legitimate interest in finding out the debtor’s bankruptcy status, we do not think the Act makes such 
inquiries illegal per se.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2000) (stating that a collector’s failure to 
include the necessary warning to the consumer is a violation). 
 245. Buckley, 249 F.3d at 681. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 681–82. 
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with the collection of a debt.248  The plaintiff would have survived the 
motion to dismiss if it had not pressed for such a categorical approach to 
the defendant’s letter. 
E. Prodding the Consumer 
A defendant need not fear a violation unless its contact with a 
consumer is “in connection with the collection of any debt.”249  After all, 
§ 1692e regulates the representations that a debt collector can make in its 
efforts to recover an outstanding debt.  If the debt is not in default, it is 
not subject to the FDCPA.  In Bailey v. Security National Servicing 
Corp.,250 the consumers hoped to stave off the lender’s enforcement 
under the original note by entering into a forbearance agreement with the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development that temporarily 
superseded the original obligation.  The servicers of the forbearance 
agreement thought they were being helpful by reminding the consumers 
of the next four payments due and of the consequences that might ensue 
from the consumers’ delinquency under the new plan.251  Unlike the 
situation in Bartlett v. Heibl,252 the servicers in Bailey made no demands 
on the consumer and were not attempting to collect any debt.253  The 
forbearance agreement had given the consumers a new lease on life, and 
thus the servicers’ letter did not relate to any existing default.254  The 
servicers’ warning about the grave consequences of a default under the 
forbearance agreement did not rise to the level of a collection letter.  
There could be no attempt at collection unless the consumers failed to 
keep their promise.255  The letter to the consumers really contained only 
information about the status of the account and underscored the 
importance of timely payments under the new arrangement.256  It could 
                                                     
 248. See id. at 682 (stating that the consumer did not want discovery in order to prove that the 
defendant was collecting debts, and that the consumer wanted a per se rule that the letter was an 
initial communication under § 1692e). 
 249. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.  The statute provides that “[a] debt collector may not use any false, 
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”  Id. 
 250. 154 F.3d 384 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 251. Id. at 386. 
 252. 128 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1997).  The collection letter in Bartlett plainly said that if the 
debtor did not pay within a week, he was going to be sued.  Id. 
 253. Bailey, 154 F.3d at 388. 
 254. Id. at 389. 
 255. Id.  The court made the point: “At most the letter contains a warning that a failure to pay the 
monthly installments (in other words, default a second time) will mean that the forbearance 
agreement becomes null and void, resulting in acceleration.”  Id. 
 256. Id.  There was similarly no communication in connection with the collection of a debt in 
Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions, LLC, No. 03-00038, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15416, at *33 (D. Haw. 
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not, therefore, be regarded as a communication in connection with the 
collection of a debt. 
Sometimes a debt collector is accused of violating the FDCPA by 
trying to collect a debt that is barred by the statute of limitations.  The 
statute prohibits the debt collector from misrepresenting the legal status 
of the debt,257 and consumers usually take the position that a debt 
collector has no business pursuing a debt which it knows cannot be 
judicially enforced if the statute of limitations has expired.  When the 
collector merely tries to collect the debt without threatening litigation, 
the courts usually find no violation.258  This is so because the statute of 
limitations generally bars the remedy, but does not extinguish the debt.259  
On the other hand, if the state statute extinguishes the debt, it is 
deceptive for a collector to try to collect it.260 
There was no doubt about the collector’s strategy in Goins v. JBC & 
Associates, P.C.261 when the collector threatened to seek “appropriate 
relief before a court of proper jurisdiction”262 even though the statute of 
limitations had expired.  The collector thought it had a good defense to 
any charge of a violation because the consumer could waive the statute 
of limitations, thus giving vitality to the debt collector’s claim.263  
However, the court recognized that the statute of limitations would be a 
complete defense to any suit and that the threat of suit was at best a 
                                                                                                                                  
July 9, 2004).  The previous owner of the account merely informed the debtor that the account was 
sold to another entity.  There was no request or demand for payment.  Id. at *32–33. 
 257. It is a violation for a collector to represent falsely “the character, amount, or legal status of 
any debt.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) (2000). 
 258. See Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 248 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that “in the absence of a threat of litigation,” no violation of the FDCPA has occurred); Wallace v. 
Capital One Bank, 168 F. Supp. 2d 526, 529 (D. Md. 2001) (finding no violation of FDCPA when 
debt collector did not try to trick debtor into waiving his rights); Shorty v. Capital One Bank, 90 F. 
Supp. 2d 1330, 1332 (D.N.M. 2000) (finding that where the letter did not threaten a lawsuit, there 
was no violation of the FDCPA). 
 259. See Wallace, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 528 (finding no violation where consumer was not tricked 
into giving up his remedy); Walker v. Cash Flow Consultants, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 613, 616 (N.D. Ill. 
2001) (finding no violation where collector tried to collect debt on which litigation was time-barred); 
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 33, § 5.5.2.9.3, at 166 (discussing the filing of time-barred 
suits). 
 260. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 893.05 (West 2004) (“When the period within which an action 
may be commenced on a Wisconsin cause of action has expired, the right is extinguished as well as 
the remedy.”); see also Klewer v. Cavalry Invs., LLC, No. 01-C-541-S, 2002 WL 2018830, at *3 
(W.D. Wis. Jan. 30, 2002) (finding that because Wisconsin’s statute of limitations extinguished the 
debt, it was deceptive for the collector to pursue collection); First Nat’l Bank of Madison v. 
Kolbeck, 19 N.W.2d 908, 909 (Wis. 1945) (stating that the statute of limitations eliminates the right 
to collect the debt and the remedy). 
 261. 352 F. Supp. 2d 262 (D. Conn. 2005). 
 262. Id. at 265. 
 263. See id. at 272 (stating that the defendants’ position was that the statute of limitations was 
not a jurisdictional bar, but simply an affirmative defense that could be waived). 
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misleading representation.264  When there is no threat, however, the 
collector’s fulfillment of his statutory obligation to provide a validation 
notice does not cause a violation.  In doing so, the collector is simply 
following the requirements of § 1692g to give the consumer salient 
information about the consumer’s debt and verification rights, and the 
statutory language does not encourage or tolerate any threat from the 
collector.265  Nevertheless, one wonders whether the absence of any 
language in the collector’s communication relating to the statute of 
limitations may mislead a consumer into thinking that the debt collector 
is trying to collect an enforceable debt.  If the consumer makes a partial 
payment to keep the collector at bay, he may find himself reviving the 
debt and thus removing the statute of limitations as a defense.266  There 
is, of course, a world of difference between inducing a consumer to make 
a payment that will lead to a waiver and merely providing a validation 
notice.267  In the latter case, the debt collector is performing its statutory 
duty as a part of a routine request for payment.268  The statute requires 
something more for a debt collector to be guilty of a violation, so there 
should be no problem unless the consumer can expose some strategy by 
the collector to lure him into a waiver of the statute of limitations. 
                                                     
 264. Id.; see also Kimber v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1489 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (stating 
that the threat of a suit after the statute of limitations has run is deceptive). 
 265. See Shorty v. Capital One Bank, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1332 (D.N.M. 2000) (finding that a 
debt validation containing mandatory statutory language did not violate the FDCPA); Aronson v. 
Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 96-2113, 1997 WL 1038818, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1997) 
(same), aff’d, 162 F.3d 1150 (3d Cir. 1998); Jang v. A.M. Miller & Assocs., Inc., No. 95-C-4919, 
1996 WL 435096, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 1996) (same), aff’d, 122 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 266. See United States v. Culver, 958 F.2d 39, 41 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that partial payment 
allows cause of action to come into existence again); Wallace v. Capital One Bank, 168 F. Supp. 2d 
526, 528 (D. Md. 2001) (stating that a letter seeking voluntary payment is not automatically violative 
because statute of limitations has run); Jenkins v. Karlton, 620 A.2d 894, 904 (Md. 1993) (stating 
that acknowledgement of a debt removes the bar set by the statute of limitations). 
 267. See Shorty, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 1332 (indicating that debt collection letters following § 1692g 
are not misleading); Aronson, 1997 WL 1038818, at *3 (explaining that following proper language 
in a collection letter does not misrepresent the debt). 
 268. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2000) (allowing creditors to send debtors written notice if statutory 
requirements are met).  The validation notice does not constitute a threat, but is merely a provision 
that requires the collector to give the consumer basic details about the debt and explains the 
consumer’s right to query the debt.  Id.  Thus, a collector must give the notice whether or not it is 
accompanied by the collector’s threat to sue.  Such notice is simply a part of the collection process, 
and the collector’s inclusion of the notice in his collection attempt does not give rise to a cause of 
action.  See Perretta v. Capital Acquisitions & Mgmt. Co., No. C-02-05561, 2003 WL 21383757, at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2003) (finding that notice and letter threatening “further steps” went beyond 
the statutory requirement and constituted a violation of the FDCPA); Reese v. Arrow Fin. Servs., 
LLC, 202 F.R.D. 83, 92 (D. Conn. 2001) (“Where debt collectors have not threatened collection 
action, courts have not found FDCPA violations solely on the mailing” of a notice). 
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In Aronson v. Commercial Financial Services, Inc.,269 the consumer 
thought he was making some headway when he advised the collector that 
the debt was barred by the statute of limitations, only to hear the 
collector reply that the “‘statute of limitations . . . only has to do with the 
length of time that it can show on your credit report.’”270  This kind of 
language can lead a consumer to forego his defense of the statute of 
limitations, and so the court in Aronson viewed the debt collector’s 
statement as misleading under § 1692e.271  It was understandable that the 
court would take this approach, since this went beyond a mere validation 
notice.  The debt collector made a definitive statement about the 
character of the debt, and the consumer had no clue that he could not rely 
on the collector’s confident assertion about the relationship between the 
statute of limitations and the credit report.  In the final analysis, however, 
the debt collector was rescued by the bona fide error defense, which the 
court deemed applicable even though the collector’s error was one of 
legal judgment.272 
A collector does not have to use outright threats in order to violate 
the statute.  A court may find an implied threat of litigation through the 
cumulative effect of the collection language and other communications 
from the collector.  Although a message on law firm letterhead is not 
sufficient by itself to be regarded as threatening,273 other factors may tilt 
the scales in favor of a threat.  This was the case in Gervais v. Riddle & 
Associates, P.C.,274 when the defendant left telephone messages for the 
                                                     
 269. No. 96-2113, 1997 WL 1038818, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1997), aff’d, 162 F.3d 1150 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
 270. Id. at *1. 
 271. Id. at *4. 
 272. Id. at *4.  A collector may use the bona fide error defense if it can show “by a 
preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error 
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2000).  The Aronson court has joined with a number of courts in resisting the 
majority position that the defense is restricted to errors of a clerical nature.  Compare Johnson v. 
Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1123 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that § 1692k(c) does not limit the bona fide 
error defense to clerical errors), and Frye v. Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & Vician, P.C., 193 F. Supp. 
2d 1070, 1085 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (same), and Taylor v. Luper, Sheriff & Niedenthal Co., 74 F. Supp. 
2d 761, 765 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (same), with Picht v. John R. Hawks, Ltd., 236 F.3d 446, 451 (8th Cir. 
2001) (finding that mistake in legal judgment is not bona fide error), and Pipiles v. Credit Bureau, 
Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 1989) (same), and Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 779 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (same), and Johnson v. Eaton, 873 F. Supp. 1019, 1028 (N.D. La. 1995) (same), and 
Martinez v. Albuquerque Collection Servs., 867 F. Supp. 1495, 1502 (D.N.M. 1994) (same). 
 273. See Veillard v. Mednick, 24 F. Supp. 2d 863, 867 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (finding that the fact that 
the letter is on law firm letterhead is not enough to find a violation); Sturdevant v. Jolas, 942 F. 
Supp. 426, 430 (D. Wis. 1996) (finding that it was not the intent of Congress to subject all attorneys 
who sent letters on their letterhead to an FDCPA action). 
 274. 363 F. Supp. 2d 345 (D. Conn. 2005). 
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consumer about an important legal matter and indicated in its letter on 
law firm letterhead that its job was to collect a debt from the 
consumer.275  The collector also invited the consumer to call if he wanted 
to resolve the matter.276  The court read this language as indicating to the 
“‘least sophisticated consumer’” that some type of legal action was in the 
offing, and that the consumer could stop it by paying off the debt.277  
This language did not carry as strong an implication as that used by the 
debt collector in Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, Inc.,278 when 
the collector informed the consumer that it had instructions to “proceed 
with whatever legal means . . . necessary to enforce collection.”279  The 
collector followed up with a second letter that indicated that the collector 
had to decide “what direction [had to] be taken to enforce collection.”280  
Although the debt collector in Bentley concluded its second letter with 
the statement that the collector had not taken, or was not taking, any 
action against the consumer, the court nevertheless held that the “least 
sophisticated consumer” would interpret the two letters in combination 
as saying that legal action was “likely and imminent.”281  The message is 
that a collector must be careful with its approach to a consumer if the 
statute of limitations is a problem, bearing in mind that courts will look 
for any veiled threat that accompanies the precatory language in the 
collector’s letter.282 
IV. THE VALIDATION NOTICE 
A. The Details of the Debt 
A debt collector must give a consumer certain basic information 
about the debt either in its initial communication, or within five days 
thereafter.283  The statute identifies the amount of the debt as one of the 
                                                     
 275. See id. at 347 (discussing the defendant’s attempts to contact the plaintiff). 
 276. See id. (detailing the contents of the message the defendant left for the plantiff). 
 277. See id. at 355 (discussing the defendant’s knowledge that the payment was due thirty days 
after the defendant received the collection letter). 
 278. 6 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 279. Id. at 61. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 61–62. 
 282. See id. at 62 (stating that the FDCPA prohibits a “threat” to take action that cannot . . . [or] 
is not intended to be taken”); Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 25–26 (2d Cir. 
1989) (same); Gervais, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 352 (stating that a collection notice that “makes the least 
sophisticated consumer uncertain as to her rights” violates the FDCPA). 
 283. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2000) (listing the information that a collector must provide to the 
consumer). 
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essential elements of the collector’s disclosure statement,284 but the debt 
collector sometimes falls short of the requirement when it uses language 
that detracts from the main message about what the consumer owes.  The 
debt collector promotes this confusion when it gives a figure that 
represents the outstanding principal, but then tries to make the consumer 
aware in some form or fashion that there are other charges that the 
consumer may have to pay which are not readily ascertainable at the time 
that the collector mails the collection letter to the consumer.  Although 
the Seventh Circuit provided a model letter in Miller v. McCalla, 
Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark L.L.C.285 to guide debt 
collectors in the validation context, debt collectors have still found 
themselves in trouble by going beyond the Miller language to give the 
consumer other directives about the amount of the debt. 
If the debt collector wants to recover not only the total amount due 
when it sends its collection letter, but also interest and other charges that 
accrue thereafter, the collector should add a Miller-type warning about 
additional amounts that may accrue between the date of the letter and the 
date of actual payment.286  Of course, if the debt collector is interested in 
recovering only the amount stated at the date of the letter, then it is less 
likely that the collector will run into difficulty if it merely states that 
amount without including any language about future charges. 
The debt collector in Chuway v. National Action Financial Services, 
Inc.287 would have been safe if it had taken the Miller model more 
seriously.  The debt collector identified the balance as $367.42, but then 
asked the consumer to telephone for the “most current balance 
information.”288  It was evident that the debt collector wanted to collect 
more than the stated amount, but the consumer could not tell from the 
collector’s letter what the additional amount would be.  If the consumer 
had gleaned additional information from a telephone call to the debt 
collector, he might still have been in a quandary about what he should 
                                                     
 284. See id. § 1692g(a)(1) (requiring debt collectors to disclose the amount of debt). 
 285. 214 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2000).  The Seventh Circuit offered a model letter to cover cases 
where the amount of the debt varies from day to day.  See supra note 210 (citing Miller and 
providing the model letter). 
 286. In McDowall v. Leschack & Grodensky, P.C., 279 F. Supp. 2d 197, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), 
the collector stated the balance due was $2942.27 plus interest and attorney’s fees.  The court 
concluded that “[b]y leaving an indeterminate amount of interest in the balance due, a collection 
letter leaves the least sophisticated consumer unsure of the magnitude of the debt.”  Id. at 200; see 
also Veach v. Sheeks, 316 F.3d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that collection letter violated 
statute by including attorney’s fees in principal balance because consumer is not liable for such fees 
before judgment by a court). 
 287. 362 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 288. Id. at 947. 
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pay, and thus the validation notice would not have fulfilled its mission of 
informing the consumer about the amount of the debt.289  The important 
message that the debt collector must send in these circumstances is that it 
may have to make a later adjustment to the amount due because of 
“interest . . . and other charges that may vary from day to day.”290 
It is open to question whether the “amount of the debt” refers to the 
unpaid balance, or to the amount that the debt collector seeks to recover 
at the time it sends its letter.  In Olson v. Risk Management Alternatives, 
Inc.,291 the debt collector listed $4881.81 as the “Balance” and $1035.00 
as “Now Due.”292  The consumer complained that the debt collector had 
failed the § 1692g(a) test by using two different amounts in the collection 
letter.  The allegation was that the collector did not clearly disclose the 
amount of the debt.293 
The court interpreted the “amount of the debt” under the statute as 
the “Balance” stated in the letter and the amount “Now Due” as the part 
of the balance that the debt collector was willing to accept until the next 
installment was due.294  It is questionable whether a debt collector should 
be given the flexibility to identify the amount of the debt in this way and 
to indicate the amount then due.  The validation notice relates to the 
collector’s communication in connection with the collection of any debt, 
and the collector is supposed to disclose the amount of that debt.  The 
debt collector would hardly be trying to collect a sum that is not yet due, 
and so it seems that the amount of the debt to be disclosed must be the 
same as the amount that the collector is trying to collect.295  If there is no 
acceleration of the debt, the collector should not confuse matters by 
                                                     
 289. The collector created an ambiguity by disclosing the balance as $367.42 and then asking the 
consumer to call for the “most current balance information.”  The consumer would hardly know the 
“amount of the debt” by relying on the collection letter.  See id. (detailing the contents of the 
collection letter sent to the plaintiff). 
 290. Miller, 214 F.3d at 876.  The court’s model letter leaves no doubt about the amount of the 
debt as of the date of the collection letter.  See id. (providing a model letter for cases where the 
amount owed varies from day to day). 
 291. 366 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 292. Id. at 510. 
 293. See id. at 512 (stating plaintiff’s argument that the “Now Due” language in the collection 
letter contradicted the validation notice and violated § 1692g). 
 294. Id. at 513. 
 295. It is true that a consumer should not interpret collection letters in a “bizarre or idiosyncratic 
fashion.”  Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2000).  
However, a collector must provide a validation notice in an effective and nonconfusing way.  See 
Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that debt collectors may not defeat the 
purpose of the FDCPA by disclosing information in a manner likely to confuse “unsophisticated 
debtors”); Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Servs., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that “if . . . 
the least sophisticated debtor would likely be misled by the notice . . . the credit service has violated 
the FDCPA”). 
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listing different figures that do not meet the single disclosure of the 
amount of the debt.  It is not within the spirit of the legislation to force a 
consumer to draw inferences from the collector’s validation notice when 
the statute imposes a clear obligation on the collector to inform the 
consumer about the debt that it is trying to collect.  The validation 
provision does not prevent a debt collector from itemizing the amount of 
the debt, but ultimately, the consumer must be able to understand the 
bottom line of the disclosure, the amount that the collector is trying to 
recover. 
In Taylor v. Cavalry Investment, L.L.C.,296 the collector identified the 
details of the debt as “‘PRINCIPAL BAL,’” “‘INTEREST OWING,’” 
and “‘TOTAL BAL DUE.’”297  The difficulty arose because the 
collector’s letter contained additional language suggesting that the 
consumer might be responsible for interest, “if applicable.”298  This 
language was reminiscent of the Seventh Circuit’s safe-harbor language 
in Miller, which drew the consumer’s attention to the possibility that the 
amount due on the payment date might be greater because of interest and 
other charges.299  The court in Taylor saw nothing confusing about the 
debt collector’s letter because it had carefully set out the total due, noting 
nevertheless that the consumer could be liable for additional charges in 
the interim.300  The language was not a model of clarity, but the court 
thought it was clear enough to prevent the consumer from raising a 
triable issue merely by asserting that he misunderstood the letter.301  
Unlike other courts, the Seventh Circuit maintained that it was left to a 
consumer, on any but the clearest case, to present objective evidence of 
confusion through consumer surveys or similar evidence.302  The 
consumer was left holding the bag, defeated by the clarity of the letter. 
Even when a letter is unclear on its face, a consumer may still have 
to present evidence of his own confusion if he hopes to get summary 
                                                     
 296. 365 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 297. Id. at 574. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872, 876 
(7th Cir. 2000). 
 300. Taylor, 365 F.3d at 574. 
 301. Id.  Some courts treat the clarity issue as a matter of law.  E.g., Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 
225 F.3d 350, 353 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000); Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1432–33 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 302. Compare Taylor, 365 F.3d at 575 (7th Cir. 2004) (requiring consumer to present objective 
evidence challenging a letter’s clarity) and Chuway v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., Inc., 362 F.3d 944, 
948 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that a consumer did not need to present evidence when the letter was, 
on its face, unclear), with Wilson, 225 F.3d at 353 n.2 (noting that interpretation of the letter does not 
hinge on extrinsic evidence), and Terran, 109 F.3d at 1432–33 (same), and Russell v. Equifax 
A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1996) (same). 
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judgment.  In Croteau v. Dearing,303 the letter seemed unclear because 
although it stated that the consumer owed “$8029.86 + interest,” it 
nevertheless informed the consumer that the collector had been hired to 
collect $8029.86, and that such an amount was past due.304  The collector 
urged the consumer to send a check for “the full amount.”305  It was 
unclear to the court whether or not the amount of the debt included 
interest, and if it did, there was no mention of a specific figure.306  
Despite this problem, the consumer could not convince the court to grant 
her summary judgment on the issue because she had not submitted an 
affidavit to support evidence of her own confusion.307  There remained a 
material question that had to be answered. 
B. Conflicting Messages 
The validation notice has been the subject of continuing controversy.  
Despite the debt collector’s obligation to disclose the salient elements of 
the transaction and the consumer’s right to dispute the debt no later than 
five days after its initial communication with the consumer,308 there is 
nothing to prevent the debt collector from trying at the same time to 
collect the debt.309  This inevitable tension between the debt collector’s 
disclosure obligation and its right to pursue the consumer has given rise 
to claims of contradiction and overshadowing by virtue of the language 
that debt collectors carefully craft to advance their own cause.  The 
problem has caused such distress in the marketplace that the Seventh 
Circuit went out of its way in Bartlett v. Heibl310 to provide a model 
letter that provided some protection for debt collectors that were willing 
                                                     
 303. No. 2:03 CV 257, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1948 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 8, 2005). 
 304. Id. at *9–*10. 
 305. Id. at *3. 
 306. Id. at *10. 
 307. Id.  Because the letter was unclear on its face, the consumer did not have to produce 
extrinsic evidence of confusion.  Id.  However, she still had to convince the court of her own 
confusion.  Id.; see also Chuway, 362 F.3d at 948 (holding that a class representative’s testimony as 
to her confusion created a triable issue of fact). 
 308. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2000). 
 309. See Peter v. GC Servs., L.P., 310 F.3d 344, 349–50 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that collection 
letter demanding payment did not violate the FDCPA); Smith v. Computer Credit, Inc., 167 F.3d 
1052, 1054–55 (6th Cir. 1999) (same); Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(same); Advisory Opinion, supra note 23 (“[T]he thirty-day time frame . . . is a dispute period within 
which the consumer may insist the collector verify the debt, not a grace period within which 
collection efforts are prohibited.”); 2005 FTC ANN. REP.: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 
14, available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/fdcpa05/050729fdcparpt.pdf (debt collectors may 
continue collection activities during the period that consumers may dispute). 
 310. 128 F.3d 497, 501–02 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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to take advice.  The safe-harbor letter should have solved many of the 
problems in the validation context,311 but problems remain simply 
because debt collectors cannot resist the urge to make sure that their 
message predominates in any communication with the consumer.312 
In many cases, the debt collector runs into trouble by including 
unnecessary language in its collection letter.  The collector is driven to 
excesses simply because it believes that such an approach will have a 
meaningful impact on the consumer.  When a collector goes overboard 
with its message, it is very likely to run afoul of the statute.  The 
collector in Sambor v. Omnia Credit Services, Inc.313 complied with the 
validation requirements, but then gave some advice about “suitable 
dispute documentation” that the consumer could use to dispute the 
debt.314  The collector must have thought that it was being helpful by 
volunteering this information.315  The only problem was that a consumer 
could reasonably conclude that he could dispute the debt only if he had 
that documentation.  But the statute does not require the consumer to 
have any documentation to lodge his dispute.  Therefore, when the 
collector thought that it was benefiting the consumer with its examples of 
“suitable dispute documentation,” it was actually misleading the 
consumer into thinking of a documentary requirement,316 when in fact 
the consumer only had to state that he disputed the debt.317  The collector 
                                                     
 311. The Bartlett court’s objective was “to devise a form of words that [would] inform the 
debtor of the risk of his being sued without detracting from the statement of his statutory rights.”  Id. 
at 501.  The model letter gave the usual details of the debt and the validation notice, but it also 
warned the debtor that the law did not require the collector to wait until the end of the thirty-day 
dispute period before suing to collect the debt.  Id. at 502. 
 312. See DeSantis v. Computer Credit, Inc., 269 F.3d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 2001) (consumer stated 
actionable claim that collection letter was confusing and contradictory when it insisted on valid 
reason for nonpayment in light of the validation notice); United States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 
F.3d 131, 137 (4th Cir. 1996) (ten-day payment deadline contradicted thirty-day period in validation 
notice for disputing debt); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991) (threat of 
immediate legal action if payment not made within ten days would induce consumer to overlook 
statutory right to dispute debt within thirty days); Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Servs., Inc., 869 F.2d 
1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that threat to consumer’s credit rating if debt not paid in ten days 
contradicted, and collection language overshadowed, validation notice); Adams v. Law Offices of 
Stuckert & Yates, 926 F. Supp. 521, 527 (E.D. Penn. 1996) (holding that demand for immediate 
payment contradicted validation notice). 
 313. 183 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. Haw. 2002). 
 314. Id. at 1235. 
 315. See id. at 1240 (citing Castro v. ARS Nat’l Servs., Inc., 2000 WL 264310, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (stating that the “additional language may have been intended to aid debtors”). 
 316. The collector’s use of the adjective “suitable” suggested that certain documentation would 
be “unsuitable.”  Id. (citing Castro, 2000 WL 264310, at *3).  But the point is that the statute does 
not require a consumer to submit any documentation at all to the collector if he wants to dispute the 
debt.  Id.; see also Castro, 2000 WL 264310, at *3 (stating that “[s]ection 1692g(a)(3) does not 
require debtors to provide documentation”). 
 317. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3)–(4) (2000) (containing no reference to documentation). 
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may have left the consumer with the impression that there was 
“unsuitable” documentation that would not fit the bill. 
When the collector used additional language in Franzos v. Pinnacle 
Credit Services LLC,318 it managed to get a judgment on the pleadings 
because the language merely indicated how the consumer could support 
his claim that the debt listed with the collector was in error and did not 
overshadow the validation notice.319  There was no reference in Franzos 
to “suitable documentation” for disputing the debt,320 and the debt 
collector gave a clear statement in the body of the letter of the 
consumer’s right to seek verification of the debt.  The other language 
appeared in a box at the end of the letter, thus giving no impression that 
the consumer’s right to dispute the debt was subject to any 
contingency.321 
In Sambor, the “suitable documentation” language appeared 
immediately after the validation notice, thus suggesting that there was a 
link between the two.322  The collector in Franzos did not make that 
mistake, for not only did it make a point of separating the additional 
language from the all-important validation notice, but it also set it out in 
smaller type as if to make its point that satisfactory proof about any 
listing error was incidental to the validation notice.323  There was less 
doubt in Franzos than in Sambor about the purpose of the language.  
Nevertheless, one still wonders whether the collectors in Sambor and 
Franzos could have done a better job of explaining how the validation 
notice fit in with the rest of the collection letter.  After all, a consumer 
should not be left to ponder whether he can merely say that he disputes 
the debt and leave it at that, or whether he must support his dispute with 
                                                     
 318. 332 F. Supp. 2d 682 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 319. The additional language in the collection letter read as follows: 
You may already have satisfactory proof that this account is listed with us in error.  If so, 
please send this notice back along with a copy of one of the following to support your 
claim: 
Bankruptcy Notice from the court stating case number and filing date 
Certificate of Death 
Canceled check showing settlement in full 
Letter from original lending institution clearing your account. 
Id. at 684. 
 320. Compare Franzos, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 684, with Sambor, 183 F. Supp. at 1239–40. 
 321. Franzos, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 687.  The additional language in the collection letter was 
placed in smaller print in a box at the end of the collection language.  Id. 
 322. See Sambor, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1239–40 (stating that the crux of the problem was the 
location of the “suitable dispute documentation” immediately after the notification of rights). 
 323. See Franzos, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 687 (stating that “the format of the Letter is such that even 
the least sophisticated consumer would not be confused”). 
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evidence satisfactory to the collector.324  Although the court in Franzos 
was satisfied that the debt collector had merely brought to the 
consumer’s attention some reasons why the debt might no longer be 
valid, the overriding consideration was the fact that the collector did not 
make the consumer’s right of verification dependent upon the production 
of any of the documents mentioned in the collection letter.325 
Some debt collectors seem to go out of their way to create ambiguity 
in their collection language.  Sometimes a collector gets away with the 
ambiguity, but not because it deserves to do so.  In McStay v. I.C. 
System, Inc.,326 the collector had dutifully followed the law in terms of 
the validation notice,327 but nevertheless advised the consumer that it 
would report the consumer to the National Credit Reporting Agencies if 
the account remained unpaid after thirty days.328  The consumer thought 
this reference to “thirty days” was sufficiently confusing to violate the 
FDCPA because it did not say when the thirty-day period would begin to 
run.329  A consumer could have interpreted the dispute period to run 
either from the date of the letter or from the date of its receipt.330  
Nevertheless, the court looked at the collection effort as a whole and 
found no cause for alarm because of the statutorily correct validation 
language, which pinpointed the time for disputing the debt as “within 30 
days after receiving [the] notice.”331  This was a problem of the 
                                                     
 324. In the same way that the Bartlett court’s model letter emphasized that a collector does not 
have to wait until the end of the thirty-day dispute period before suing, Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 
497, 502 (7th Cir. 1997), the collector in a Franzos-type case can include language that reassures the 
consumer that although the statute does not require the consumer to submit any documentation when 
he disputes the debt, he may do so if he wants to.  See Franzos, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 686 (finding a 
written response sufficient without further documentation).  In this way, a collector leaves no doubt 
about the consumer’s statutory right to dispute the debt without undertaking any obligation to 
comply with other nonexistent statutory requirements.  See Mendez v. M.R.S. Assocs., No. 03-C-
6753, 2005 WL 1564977, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 2005) (finding collector’s requirement of 
providing a valid reason for disputing the debt to be a violation of FDCPA); Whitten v. ARS  Nat’l 
Servs., Inc., No. 00-C-6080, 2002 WL 1332001, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2002) (finding collector’s 
requirement of providing documentation to dispute debt to be violation of FDCPA); NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 33, § 5.7.2.6.1, at 223 (“[A] consumer need only send a letter 
stating ‘I dispute the debt’ in order to dispute the debt.”). 
 325. See Franzos, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 686 (finding a list of documents contained in letter to be a 
suggestion, not a requirement for disputing the debt). 
 326. 308 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 327. Id. at 189–90. 
 328. Id. at 189. 
 329. Id. at 190. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. at 191.  This language contrasted sharply with the collector’s threat to report the 
consumer to the credit reporting agencies if “after 30 days [the] account is not paid in full.”  Id. at 
189. 
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collector’s own doing.332  The reference to “after 30 days” was sure to 
raise a question in the consumer’s mind, even if it would not baffle the 
consumer within the context of the whole letter.  This is but one example 
of the kind of problem raised by a collector’s loose language.  The 
collector carefully followed the statutory mandate by using the precise 
language of § 1692g and then confused matters with its own message.333 
This is not an unusual predicament for a debt collector.  A similar 
problem arose recently in Vega v. Credit Bureau Enterprises334 when the 
collector’s validation notice passed muster, but its other collection 
language left much to be desired.335  The first sentence of the collection 
letter advised: “This account has been forwarded to this office . . . to 
collect the balance in full unless disputed in writing within 30 days from 
this notice.”336  The collector obviously wanted to make an immediate 
impression on the consumer that the consumer had to dispute the debt in 
writing or the collector would try to collect the balance.  This was the 
entire message in the letter’s first paragraph.337  There was no ambiguity 
in the language.  The collector was confident in requiring the consumer’s 
dispute to be in writing because it believed that Congress intended § 
1692g(a)(3) to have that requirement, just like § 1692g(a)(4) and § 
1692g(a)(5).338  This was by no means a novel defense, for collectors 
have tried on many occasions to convince a court that a writing 
requirement should be implied in subsection (a)(3) just because it 
appears in both subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5).  Fortunately, most courts 
                                                     
 332. The language concerning the reporting of the consumer’s status after thirty days appeared 
on the front of the collection letter.  Id. at 189.  At the bottom there was a reference in capitals to the 
reverse side of the letter for important information.  Id.  That important information was the 
validation notice which correctly identified the dispute period as thirty days after receiving the 
collection notice.  Id.  Although the court was sympathetic with the collector on this occasion, the 
question still remains whether a consumer should have to work out the conflict for himself or 
whether a collector should be forced into a consistent pattern of fulfilling the statutory mandate 
without confusing the consumer.  It is not asking too much to require the collector to convey its 
message clearly and effectively without creating uncertainty in the consumer’s mind.  See Savino v. 
Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that changing language in the demand 
letter will avoid confusion without imposing a burden on collector); Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 
500–01 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding failure to explain apparent contradiction violated the FDCPA); 
Miller v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that technical 
compliance is not sufficient if notice is not effectively conveyed); Edwards v. Nat’l Bus. Factors, 
Inc., 897 F. Supp. 455, 458 (D. Nev. 1995) (finding notice with confusing language to be invalid). 
 333. See McStay, 308 F.3d at 191 (“[T]he letter contained all the information specifically 
required by section 1692g[, however,] . . . the message on the front of the letter is ambiguous.”). 
 334. No. CIVA02CV1550DGT KAM, 2005 WL 711657 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2005). 
 335. Id. at *7, *10. 
 336. Id. at *1. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at *7. 
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have not read a writing requirement into subsection (a)(3) because they 
have seen the rationale for the statutory distinction between the 
subsections and have clung to the plain meaning of the statute.339  
Subsection (a)(3) allows a consumer to raise questions about the debt 
without committing his objections to writing so that a collector would at 
least be aware of possible problems concerning the debt.340  This does 
not detract from the requirement that the notice of the dispute be in 
writing if the consumer wants to invoke his verification rights under the 
statute.341  If the consumer disputes the debt in writing, the debt collector 
must suspend its collection activities until it complies with the 
consumer’s request for verification.342  Therefore, subsections (a)(3) and 
(a)(4) fulfill different functions.343 
                                                     
 339. See Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding no 
writing requirement under § 1692g(a)(3)); Baez v. Wagner & Hunt, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1277 
(S.D. Fla. 2006) (finding that Congress intentionally omitted a writing requirement from § 
1692g(a)(3)); Rosado v. Taylor, 324 F. Supp. 2d 917, 929 (N.D. Ind. 2004) (imposing a writing 
requirement in § 1692g(a)(3) violates the statute); In re Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 
493, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he Second Circuit . . . would permit disputes to be raised otherwise 
than in writing.”); Sanchez v. Robert E. Weiss, Inc. (In re Sanchez), 173 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 
(N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding no writing requirement under § 1692(a)(3)); Ong v. Am. Collections 
Enter., No. 98-CV-5117 (JG), 1999 WL 51816, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1999) (reasoning that 
Congress’s omission of “in writing” from § 1692(a)(3) was intentional).  But see Graziano v. 
Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding § 1692(a)(3)–(5) to have a writing requirement); 
Castillo v. Carter, No. IP-99-1757-C H/G, 2001 WL 238121, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 28, 2001) (finding 
no violation of § 1692g(a)(3) when collector required dispute in writing); Sturdevant v. Thomas E. 
Jolas, P.C., 942 F. Supp. 426, 429 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (requiring dispute of debt in writing because 
court was persuaded by Graziano). 
 340. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) (2000) (requiring the debt collector to give the consumer a 
written statement that the debt will be assumed to be valid unless the consumer disputes the validity 
of the debt). 
 341. The phrase “in writing” appears in § 1692g(a)(4), but not in § 1692g(a)(3). 
 342. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 
 343. In Graziano, the Third Circuit was worried that if it did not require a writing in both § 
1692g(a)(3) and § 1692g(a)(4), “the debt collector would be without any statutory ground for 
assuming that the debt was valid, but nevertheless would not be required to verify the debt . . . and 
would be permitted to continue debt collection efforts.”  950 F.2d at 112.  It saw no reason why 
Congress would create such an “incoherent . . . system.”  Id.  Another court thought this was a “silly 
result” and hoped that this was not what Congress intended.  In re Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, 208 
F.R.D. at 502.  Nevertheless, the court in Sanchez provided a reasonable explanation for reading § 
1692g(a)(3) as not requiring a writing.  It suggested as follows: 
This reading of § 1692g(a)(3) would serve two purposes: 1) It would provide an informal 
red flag to a debt collector so that it might quickly and inexpensively check the validity of 
the debt without triggering the formal requirements of §§ 1692g(a)(4), (5) and 1692g(b); 
and 2) it would provide limited protection to debtors upon communicating a non-written 
dispute. 
173 F. Supp. 2d at 1034. 
 In Graziano, the Third Circuit did not discuss the presumption that when Congress omits 
particular language in one section but includes it in another section of the same statute, it acts 
intentionally to create a distinction between the two sections.  See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 
498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991) (discussing the implication of omission of certain language by Congress).  
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When the collector in Vega used the first paragraph of its letter to 
emphasize the necessity of disputing the debt in writing, the subsequent 
validation language at the bottom of the collection letter paled in 
comparison to the initial message.  It was not the only misleading part of 
the letter.  Here was another example where a collector went out of its 
way to contradict the clear language of the validation notice by requiring 
the consumer to dispute the debt “within 30 days from [the] notice.”344  
When the consumer looked at the concluding paragraph, she saw that she 
could dispute the debt “within thirty (30) days from receiving [the] 
notice.”345  One could not find a clearer contradiction.  Surely the 
collector could not contend that those two phrases had the same meaning, 
but there they were in the same letter, crying out for an explanation. 
Although a collector does not have to quote the exact statutory 
language in its validation notice, it must be careful not to wander too far 
afield in trying to comply with the statute.  When the collector in Smith v. 
Hecker346 advised the consumer that the debt would be “assessed valid” 
if the consumer did not dispute it,347 he was sure to raise questions about 
his reasons for replacing the language, “assumed to be valid,” with his 
version.  It seemed odd that the collector would go out of his way to 
change “assumed” to “assessed,” when the new term seemed destined to 
cause problems for him.  The court looked to the definition of the two 
words and concluded that a consumer would be unlikely to interpret the 
sentence containing the word “assessed” to mean that her debt would be 
assumed valid if she did not dispute it.348  The term “assessed” gave the 
impression that the collector was referring to a determination of the 
debt’s validity by some external authority or credit reporting agency.349 
But that was not the only cause of confusion.  The statutory language 
makes it clear that if the consumer does not dispute the debt, the debt 
will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector.  Not only did the debt 
                                                                                                                                  
There is something to be said for respecting the plain language of the statute.  See 2A SINGER, supra 
note 41, § 46.01 (discussing the “plain meaning rule” of statutory construction); see also Camacho, 
430 F.3d at 1081 (stating that “[t]he plain meaning of § 1692g is that debtors can trigger the rights 
under subsection (a)(3) by either an oral or written ‘dispute’”); Brady v. Credit Recovery Co., 160 
F.3d 64, 66–67 (1st Cir. 1998) (using “plain language” to interpret §§ 1692e(8) and 1692g(b)); Vega, 
2005 WL 711657, at *8 (discussing use of plain language rule to determine the effect of omitting the 
writing requirement); Walters v. PDI Mgmt. Servs., No. 1:02-CV-1100-JDT-TAB, 2004 WL 
1622217, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 16, 2004) (finding that “[t]he plain language of subsection (a)(3) does 
not require that the consumer dispute the validity of the debt in writing”). 
 344. Vega, 2005 WL 711657, at *1. 
 345. Id. (emphasis added). 
 346. No. Civ.A. 04-5820, 2005 WL 894812 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2005). 
 347. Id. at *1. 
 348. Id. at *5. 
 349. Id. 
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collector in Smith substitute “assessed” for “assumed,” but he also 
omitted “by the debt collector” from his version of the validation 
notice.350  Therefore, the consumer did not know who was doing the 
“assessing” under the collector’s scheme of things.  This omission fit in 
nicely with the use of the term “assessed” to prove deception, thus 
contributing to an ineffective validation notice.  A consumer might have 
been led to believe that unless she disputed the debt, the debt would be 
regarded as valid by a “court, credit agency, or other entity rather than 
merely by the debt collector.”351  The collector could hardly expect much 
sympathy from the court under these circumstances, since he gave no 
rationale for deviating from the statutory message. 
A consumer has a right to seek verification of the debt within thirty 
days after receiving the validation notice from the debt collector, and 
until the consumer does so, the debt collector can continue its collection 
activities during this thirty-day window simply because it is not a grace 
period for the consumer’s respite.352  It is instead a period during which a 
consumer may contest the debt’s validity, and if he does so, the debt 
collector must then cease collection of the debt until it can mail the 
verification to the consumer.353  Even though the debt collector must 
cease collection when the consumer lodges his dispute, it does not have 
to inform the consumer of this requirement.354  If it is important for a 
consumer to be aware of the tools in his armor, then the drafters should 
have left no stone unturned in outlining the mechanism for the consumer 
to challenge the debt collector.355  Once the consumer knows that he will 
have some temporary relief from the debt collector’s bombardment, he 
will probably be more enthusiastic about marshalling his forces to deal 
                                                     
 350. The statute requires the debt collector to give the consumer a statement that if the consumer 
does not dispute the debt, “the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector.”  15 U.S.C. § 
1692g(a)(3) (2000).  The collector’s message was that “[t]he debt will be assessed valid.”  Smith, 
2005 WL 894812, at *1. 
 351. Id. at *5. 
 352. See Smith v. Computer Credit, Inc., 167 F.3d 1052, 1055 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing 
collection agency’s ability to continue collection during thirty day period); Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 
F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); Advisory Opinion, supra note 23 (same); 2005 FTC ANN. 
REP., supra note 309, at 14 (“The Commission consistently has taken the position that the existing 
statute permits collection efforts to continue during the thirty-day period if the consumer has not 
disputed the debt in writing or requested verification.” (citation omitted)). 
 353. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 
 354. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 33, § 5.7.3.4, at 239.  The court in Bartlett was 
generous by including that requirement in its model validation notice.  See 128 F.3d at 502 (stating 
the court’s suggested form and including a clause informing the debtor of the requirement). 
 355. It seems that § 1692g(b) is a natural corollary of § 1692g(a)(4).  A consumer would 
certainly be interested in knowing the effect of querying the validity of the debt.  It is not clear why 
the drafters isolated, in § 1692g, the effect that a consumer’s action would have on the debt collector. 
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with the debt collector.  The interim cease-fire period will surely create 
the right climate for a resolution of the problem. 
C. The Impact of the Validation Language 
Although the statute gives a consumer thirty days to dispute the debt, 
he may find himself in difficulty if the debt collector continues the 
collection process by placing a lien on the consumer’s property.  In 
Shimek v. Forbes,356 the debt collector mailed a lien to the county clerk 
on the same day that it sent a demand letter to the consumer advising the 
consumer that he had a right to dispute the debt within thirty days.357  
When the consumer later requested verification, the debt collector did 
nothing to prevent the county clerk from recording the lien.358  The 
consumer raised the question whether the statutory directive for the 
collector to cease its collection activities pending verification of the debt 
included an affirmative obligation to intervene and stop the recording of 
the lien.359  The Eleventh Circuit did not read any such obligation into the 
statute, for the debt collector had already mailed the documents to the 
county clerk when the consumer disputed the debt.360  The collector 
would have violated the statute if it had done its mailing after the 
consumer had lodged his dispute.361 
The Shimek case provides an example of the kind of mischief that the 
validation section can cause as long as the FDCPA recognizes the thirty-
day period as merely one that gives the consumer an opportunity to query 
the debt, without imposing a corresponding duty on the debt collector to 
suspend its activities in the absence of that query.362  Even though a 
consumer has the right to seek verification, that does not necessarily 
                                                     
 356. 374 F.3d 1011 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 357. Id. at 1012. 
 358. See id. at 1012–13 (showing lack of action on part of debt collector leading to the lien being 
recorded). 
 359. Id. at 1014. 
 360. Id. 
 361. See Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1031 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
second letter mailed after debtor’s cease-and-desist letter was a bona fide error); Loigman v. Kings 
Landing Condo. Ass’n, 734 A.2d 367, 373 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1999) (holding that repeated 
attempts to collect debt after verification letter was sent violated the FDCPA). 
 362. See Smith v. Computer Credit, Inc., 167 F.3d 1052, 1055 (6th Cir. 1999) (debt collector’s 
letter did not threaten debtor’s right to question validity of debt); Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 501 
(7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the debt collector must cease collection activities after the mailing of 
a verification letter); Miller v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(cessation of debt collection activities only until validation letter is sent); Advisory Opionion, supra 
note 23 (discussing the FTC’s opinion that collectors need not cease collection efforts during the 
thirty-day period if debtor does not dispute the debt in writing). 
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mean that he will get it.  A debt collector may adopt a strategy of 
returning all disputed debts to the creditor.  Although the debt collector 
will be unable to resume its activities until it validates the debt, it may 
nevertheless ignore the consumer’s request for verification and leave the 
creditor to deal with the problem.  Once that happens, the debt collector 
is out of the picture and thereafter has no obligation to respond to the 
consumer’s request for verification despite its promise to do so.363 
It seems odd that the debt collector can keep the consumer in limbo 
without giving him the results of its inquiries concerning the validity of 
the debt.  The statute allows the debt collector to give a promise of 
verification, but does not require the debt collector to tell the consumer 
that it is suspending collection while it verifies the debt.364  If the creditor 
has an arrangement with the debt collector to return the files of all 
disputed debts, the debt collector really has a safety valve for all 
disputes.  The parties’ agreement relieves the collector of any duty to 
respond to the consumer’s dispute, while at the same time allowing the 
creditor to try again through another collector.  The statute would surely 
be more effective if it required the debt collector to advise the consumer 
that it will either furnish the requested verification or cease collection 
activities.365  In the latter event, the debt collector should promptly notify 
the consumer of its decision so that the consumer does not think that he 
has a cloud hanging over him, even though the debt collector may not be 
pressing him at the moment.  This approach would be more satisfactory 
than merely allowing a collection agency to choose between ceasing all 
collection activity or providing verification. 
The statute also requires the debt collector to include in its validation 
notice a statement that it will obtain “verification of the debt or a copy of 
a judgment against the consumer.”366  In all fairness, the collector has no 
choice in making this promise, since the statute demands that the 
                                                     
 363. See Jang v. A.M. Miller & Assocs., 122 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a debt 
collector may choose not to verify the debt if it ceases collection activity); Smith, 953 F.2d at 1032 
(holding that debt collector did not violate § 1692g(b) since it ceased collection activities); Bleich v. 
Revenue Maximization Group, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d 496, 500 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (explaining that once 
debtor attempts verification all collection activity must stop); Sambor v. Omnia Credit Servs., Inc., 
183 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1242 (D. Haw. 2002) (holding that because debt collector ceased collection 
activities verification was not required under FDCPA). 
 364. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (2000) (“[D]ebt collector shall cease collection of the debt . . . 
until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of the judgment . . . .”). 
 365. Even though the court in Jang ruled in favor of the collector, it recognized that “the statute 
might be more informative for debtors if it required a notice that the debt collector would either 
provide the requested verification or cease all collection activities.”  122 F.3d at 484. 
 366. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 
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collector’s notice include a statement to that effect.367  Nevertheless, 
there is room for improvement in this context because there may be no 
existing judgment against the consumer, and the debt collector may find 
itself promising to produce a copy of something that does not exist.  The 
use of the term “judgment” is sufficient to send a consumer into a panic 
because a consumer may not expect a debt collector to refer to a 
judgment where none exists.  It is submitted, therefore, that the 
validation notice should add such language as is necessary to clarify the 
point that the debt collector will obtain a copy of a judgment only if one 
has been obtained against the consumer.368  Such an amendment would 
not dilute the effect of the debt collector’s promise, but instead would 
make its fulfillment depend on the actual state of affairs.369  It may even 
be desirable for a collector to omit any reference to a judgment in its 
validation notice if there is no judgment.370  A reference in this context to 
“a non-existent judgment serves no similar salutary purpose,” especially 
if a collector has promised a copy of the judgment rather than one of a 
judgment.371  Such specificity leads to greater mischief, for then the 
consumer is led to believe that the collector is dealing with a judgment 
that has already been obtained.  This only adds to the consumer’s 
confusion. 
                                                     
 367. See Moore v. Ingram & Assocs., 805 F. Supp. 7, 9 (D.S.C. 1992) (holding that the required 
notice provision is not misleading); Check Cent. of Or., Inc. v. Barr (In re Barr), 54 B.R. 922, 925–
26 (D. Or. 1984) (noting that the language of the letter mirrors FDCPA); Blackwell v. Prof’l Bus. 
Servs. of Ga., Inc., 526 F. Supp. 535, 539 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that use of the term “judgment” 
in notice does not violate FDCPA); Duncan v. Nichols, 451 S.E.2d 24, 26 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994) 
(allowing language directly taken from § 1692g(a)(4) to be used in notice letter). 
 368. The cases have had no problem with a collector’s use of the statutory language because the 
validation notice contains the collector’s promise to obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a 
judgment.  Thus, the courts interpret that language as providing an alternative for the collector.  In 
the absence of a judgment, it can always rely on the verification to support its demands.  Moore, 805 
F. Supp. at 9; In re Barr, 54 B.R. at 925–26. 
 369. Although the statutory language refers to “a copy of a judgment,” § 1692g(a)(4), it may be 
problematic if the collector refers instead to “a copy of the judgment.”  This language suggests that a 
judgment has been obtained against the consumer and a collection letter does not avoid the 
confusion even if it also promises verification of the debt as an alternative.  The court in Blackwell, 
applying a reasonable consumer standard, did not appreciate the distinction between “a judgment” 
and “the judgment” and found that “a verification notice differing by a single definite article from 
the language of the statute [did] not in itself constitute a false representation of the legal status of the 
debt.”  526 F. Supp. at 539. 
 370. See Beeman v. Lacy, Katzen, Ryen & Mittleman, 892 F. Supp. 405, 410 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(holding that a debt collector should not confuse a debtor if a judgment does not exist); Stojanovski 
v. Strobl & Manoogian, P.C., 783 F. Supp. 319, 324 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (explaining that it would be a 
violation to falsely state that a copy of a nonexistent judgment would be produced). 
 371. Beeman, 892 F. Supp. at 410. 
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D. The Relevance of a Writing 
On another front, one may query the rationale for allowing a debt 
collector to satisfy § 1692g with an oral validation notice.372  The statute 
allows a debt collector to convey the § 1692g information in its initial 
communication with the consumer, but such a communication need not 
be written.373  It is only if the debt collector does not use the initial 
communication to give the validation notice that the statute requires a 
written notice within five days thereafter.374  A consumer should not be 
expected to absorb all of the information contained in an oral notice, but 
the statute imposes no writing requirement for the initial contact. 
The case for allowing a debt collector to give a consumer oral notice 
of the consumer’s validation rights under the current statutory language 
is based on the placement of the phrase “the following information” in § 
1692g(a).  The present language requires the debt collector to give the 
consumer a written notice containing the information in § 1692g(a)(1)–
(5), unless the collector includes that information in the initial 
communication.375  The only way of interpreting the section as 
mandating a writing in this context is to conclude that the phrase “the 
following information” refers to the “written notice” required of the debt 
collector.376  But it seems more logical to treat the written notice as 
containing the information contemplated by the statute, rather than 
regarding the notice itself as the information. 
The only other approach that will support a writing in all 
circumstances covering a validation notice is if the definition of 
“communication” is restricted to a writing.377  The legislative history 
                                                     
 372. The FTC Staff Commentary provides that “[i]f a debt collector’s first communication with 
the consumer is oral, he may make the disclosures orally at that time in which case he need not send 
a written notice.”  FTC Staff Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,108. 
 373. The statute defines the term “communication” as “the conveying of information regarding a 
debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2000). 
 374. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 
 375. It is more reasonable to read the section as requiring the debt collector to send the consumer 
a written notice containing certain information, unless that information is contained in the initial 
communication.  The information contemplated is set out in § 1692g(a)(1)–(5). 
 376. It seems contrary to the plain language of the statute to equate “information” with the 
required “notice.”  It is the notice that contains the information. 
 377. The definition of “communication” is clear and does not support restricting it to a writing.  
See § 1692a(2) (defining “communication” as the conveying of information regarding a debt directly 
or indirectly to any person through any medium).  The FTC Commentary agrees that “the definition 
includes oral and written transmission of messages which refer to a debt.”  FTC Staff Commentary, 
supra note 11, at 50,101; see also Silbert v. Asset Res., Inc., No. 99-1348, 2000 WL 680243, at *2 
(D. Minn. Feb. 14, 2000) (initial phone call would be valid notice if § 1692g(a) disclosures were 
provided). 
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does not offer any independent evidence to require such a writing.  A 
prior Senate bill demanded that the debt collector should, “unless such is 
contained in the initial communication[,] . . . send the consumer a written 
notice containing the following information.”378  Even in this context, the 
word “such” refers to the “information” that the notice must contain, 
rather than to the notice itself, for one would not normally think of a 
written notice being contained in a communication.  The notice is itself 
the communication, and the language in both the bill and the current 
statute suggests that it is the initial communication or the subsequent 
written notice that must contain the information that is the essence of the 
consumer’s verification rights.379 
The validation section raises another issue concerning the effect of a 
consumer disputing the debt.  Under subsection (a)(3), a collector will 
assume that the debt is valid if the consumer does not dispute the debt 
within thirty days, and under subsection (a)(4), the debt collector 
promises to obtain verification if the consumer disputes the debt in 
writing.  The judicial disagreement that has arisen from the absence in 
subsection (a)(3) of the phrase “in writing,” has left some uncertainty 
about the congressional intent in drafting these subsections.  It is 
reasonable to infer that Congress intended to provide some leeway for a 
consumer to lodge some objection to the debt collector’s claim without 
going through the formality of a writing, especially if the consumer is 
unable to fulfill the writing requirement.380  If the consumer disputes the 
debt orally, the debt collector may be motivated to investigate the 
transaction in order to satisfy itself of the validity of the debt.  Allowing 
the consumer to dispute the debt orally may still serve some legitimate 
purpose by avoiding litigation costs.381 
                                                     
 378. S. 918, 95th Cong. § 809(a) (1977). 
 379. The Senate Report on the FDCPA does not do much to support the idea that the statute 
forbids an oral validation notice.  For example, in explaining the validation of debt, the report 
provides that “[a]fter initially contacting a consumer, a debt collector must send him or her written 
notice stating the name of the creditor and the amount owed.”  S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977), 
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699.  This does not suggest that the initial contact must be in 
writing and the statute requires the written notice only if the “information” is not contained in the 
“initial communication.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).  It is understandable that the drafters wanted to ease 
the burden on a collector by not requiring it to give the validation notice again if it had already done 
so in the first communication.  See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 33, § 5.7.2.4, at 216 
(explaining why statutory language should be interpreted to require written notice of verification 
rights).  However, it is fair to say that the drafters have fallen short because of their failure to deal 
with the impact of the term “communication” on the overall validation scheme. 
 380. See Ong v. Am. Collections Enter., Inc., No. 98-CV-5117, 1999 WL 51816, at *3 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1999) (“It is not unreasonable to believe that some consumers who wish to 
dispute an alleged debt may lack the ability or wherewithal to do so in writing . . . .”). 
 381. A debt collector would hardly want to pursue a consumer without further inquiry if there is 
any inkling that the validity of the debt is in question.  As the court in Spearman v. Tom Wood 
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If the statute allowed the consumer to dispute the debt orally for 
purposes of both subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4), then there would be no 
argument about the current difference in language.  But although this 
congruity would be helpful in settling this simmering dispute, a 
consumer would still be well advised to dispute the debt in writing in 
order to preserve a record of the communication between himself and the 
debt collector.  After all, the consumer has the burden to show how and 
when he disputed the debt, and if he wants to make his case, the 
consumer will gravitate towards the written document rather than the 
spoken word. 
The other alternative is to require a writing in all cases.  This 
requirement may put many consumers at a disadvantage, for then they 
will not be able to send a message that there may be nothing to the 
collector’s claim, without resorting to the formality of a writing.  There 
may be very good reasons why a consumer may be unable to put his 
dispute in writing, and so it is in order to ask whether such a consumer 
should be denied the opportunity to raise questions about the debt.  The 
consumer’s challenge in this context should not be as daunting as when a 
debt collector gives an oral validation notice in its initial communication 
with the consumer.  If a debt collector can orally convey all of the 
validation information in that communication, it seems that the consumer 
should have an easier time making the debt collector aware of his doubts 
about the debt.  It is hard to accept that an oral notice is allowable to 
convey all of the information required under subsection (a), but a 
consumer is not able to use the same medium to convey just one 
message, that he disputes the debt.  As a matter of principle, the sections 
should be consistent unless there is some good reason to make the 
distinction. 
                                                                                                                                  
Pontiac-GMC, Inc., observed: “[S]ubsection (a)(3) provides some protection to those consumers 
who dispute a debt but are unable to do so in writing, perhaps the very consumers who are more 
likely to be unsophisticated.”  IPOO-1340-C-T/K, 2002 WL 31854892, at *27 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 4, 
2002).  Although the collector would not have to verify the debt to the consumer in writing at this 
stage or cease its collection activities, the consumer’s intervention may at least encourage the 
collector’s curiosity.  See Vega v. Credit Bureau Enter., No. CIVA02V1550DGT KAM, 2005 WL 
711657, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2005) (noting that subsection (a)(3) does not impose a requirement 
that a consumer dispute the validity of a debt in writing). 
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V. UNFAIR OR UNCONSCIONABLE MEANS 
A. The Language on the Envelope 
The statute prohibits a debt collector from using unfair or 
unconscionable means to collect a debt.382  A specific provision prevents 
a collector from using any language or symbol on an envelope when 
communicating with a consumer, except the collector’s name.383  But 
even then, the collector’s name cannot indicate that the collector is in the 
debt collection business.384  This provision has caused difficulties 
because its plain language allows on the envelope only the collector’s 
address and the collector’s business name if it does not reflect that the 
sender is in the collection business.  If the statutory language is taken at 
face value, the use of any other language constitutes a violation.  But the 
congressional purpose in prohibiting this type of conduct was to ensure 
that collectors would not use “symbols on envelopes indicating that the 
contents pertain to debt collection.”385  The collector cannot therefore 
embarrass the consumer by using collection language or symbols on an 
envelope. 
The statute is quite firm in prohibiting any language or symbol other 
than that allowed.  It is open to question whether Congress had to use 
such exclusionary language to make its point about ensuring that a debt 
collector would not open a consumer up to ridicule by letting others in on 
the collector’s pursuit of the consumer.  The effect of the plain language 
approach would have prevented the collector in Masuda v. Thomas 
Richards & Co.386 from using the words “Personal and Confidential” on 
its envelope, and yet such language fulfilled the very objective that 
Congress intended to promote in § 1692f(8) by keeping confidential the 
communication between the collector and the consumer.  The Masuda 
court viewed the terms on the envelope as “benign language” which was 
not covered by the statute.387  Such harmless words did not give a clue 
about the purpose of the communication.388 
                                                     
 382. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (2000). 
 383. Id. § 1692f(8).  Section 1692f includes, without limitation, seven examples of unfair 
practices. 
 384. Id.  The section provides that “a debt collector may use his business name if such name 
does not indicate that he is in the debt collection business.”  Id. 
 385. S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 8 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1702. 
 386. 759 F. Supp. 1456 (C.D. Cal. 1991). 
 387. Id. at 1466. 
 388. This was consistent with the purpose of § 1692f(8), that is, “to prevent debt collectors from 
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In Peter v. GC Services L.P.,389 the Fifth Circuit read § 1692f(8) as 
not producing an absurd result when read as a whole, and thus did not 
think it was necessary to go beyond the statutory text.390  Since the 
section contemplates use of the mails, the court felt comfortable with 
allowing language on an envelope that facilitated the envelope’s 
movement through the mails, as long as such language did not violate the 
section’s specific prohibitions.391  So the court had no objection to having 
the debtor’s name and address or a postage stamp on the envelope, even 
though the section does not mention those items.392  But the court in 
Peter did not need to reach the issue about an implicit exemption for 
benign language since the collector’s impersonation of the Department of 
Education was not benign.  The court found a violation of § 1692f(8) 
because the collector had impersonated a public agency, and any implicit 
exception for benign language could not be stretched to accommodate 
that deception.393 
A little later in Goswami v. American Collections Enterprise, Inc., 
the Fifth Circuit found the statutory provision ambiguous and looked 
beyond the statute’s plain language to find a solution.394  In this case, the 
offending language on the envelope was “priority letter,” a term that 
seemed normal within the mailing context, but which the consumer 
argued was impermissible under § 1692f(8).395  The court recognized that 
the statute was open to more than one reasonable interpretation.396  The 
court observed that the section could be read in isolation as prohibiting 
all language or markings other than the names and addresses of the 
                                                                                                                                  
‘using symbols on envelopes indicating that the contents pertain to debt collection.’”  759 F. Supp. at 
1466 (citing S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 8, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1702) (emphasis omitted)). 
 389. 310 F.3d 344, 352 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 390. The court recognized that “the use of the mails” provision in 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8) makes 
allowance for those items that are “necessary for an envelope to move through the mails.”  Id. at 
351.  Such items include “the name and address of the debtor [and] required postage . . . .”  Id.  So 
there was nothing in the statute to prevent a debt collector from placing a stamp on the envelope. 
 391. See id. (finding that § 1692f(8) allowed items such as the name and address of a debtor and 
required postage because the items are necessary for an envelope to move through the mail). 
 392. Id.; see also Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 316, 319 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(use of corporate logo with initials “DCS” and the terms “PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL” on 
the envelope did not violate § 1692f(8)); Lindbergh v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 175, 180 
& n.27 (D. Conn. 1994) (a blue stripe and the word “transmittal” on an envelope did not violate § 
1692f(8)); Johnson v. NCB Collection Servs., 799 F. Supp. 1298, 1304–05 (D. Conn. 1992) (use of 
the “Revenue Department” was not a violation). 
 393. Peter, 310 F.3d at 352.  One of the abuses that Congress had in mind was the impersonation 
of government officials in trying to collect a debt.  S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 2, reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1696. 
 394. 377 F.3d 488, 493 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 395. Id. at 491. 
 396. Id. at 493. 
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parties.397  On the other hand, it could be read in conjunction with its 
introductory language as prohibiting only such language or markings that 
are unfair or unconscionable because they humiliate or embarrass a 
consumer.398  In light of this ambiguity, the court reverted to legislative 
history and the FTC Staff Commentary in order to arrive at a sensible 
construction of the statute.399  It opted for the benign language exception 
because the term “priority letter” did not say anything about the 
consumer’s delinquency, did not contribute to the consumer’s 
embarrassment, and did not invade the consumer’s privacy.400 
B. Taking or Threatening Nonjudicial Action 
Section 1692f(6) prohibits taking or threatening nonjudicial action to 
repossess property when there is no right to do so,401 and for purposes of 
that section, anyone whose principal business is the enforcement of 
security interests is regarded as a debt collector.402  A violation can occur 
if the repossessor breaches the peace because under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, the right to repossess no longer exists if a breach of 
the peace may ensue.403 
A repossession often occurs when a creditor tries to enforce its 
security interest in a consumer’s automobile.  If the consumer has 
personal property inside the automobile at the time the repossessor takes 
the automobile, the consumer will usually complain about a violation of 
the FDCPA.404  However, the statute applies only when there is no right 
to property “claimed as collateral.”405  Therefore, the statute applies to an 
automobile, which is the property the enforcer seeks to claim as 
                                                     
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. 
 399. One of the unfair practices that Congress was interested in preventing was “using symbols 
on envelopes indicating that the contents pertain to debt collection.”  S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 8 
(1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1702. 
 400. See Goswami, 377 F.3d at 494 (citing Lindbergh v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 
175, 180 (D. Conn. 1994); Johnson v. NCB Collection Servs., 799 F. Supp. 1298, 1305 (D. Conn. 
1992); Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., 759 F. Supp. 1456, 1466 (C.D. Cal. 1991)) (finding that 
other courts have adopted a benign language exception to § 1692f(8) for terms like “priority letter”). 
 401. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) (2000). 
 402. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2000). 
 403. U.C.C. § 9-609(b)(2) (2002). 
 404. See Nadalin v. Auto. Recovery Bureau, Inc., 169 F.3d 1084, 1084–85 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(discussing whether the incidental taking of personal property during an automobile repossession 
violated the FDCPA); Larranga v. Mile High Collection & Recovery Bureau, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 111, 
112–13 (D.N.M. 1992) (complaining that the incidental taking of personal property during an 
automobile repossession violated the FDCPA and was an act of conversion). 
 405. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A). 
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collateral for the creditor, but does not apply to any property that is 
inside.  The nonjudicial action contemplated by § 1692f(6) relates to that 
collateral, and thus the FDCPA does not relate to any incidental 
possession of property that is not affected by the creditor’s security 
interest.406 
Since an enforcer of a security interest is regarded as a debt collector 
only for the purpose of § 1692f(6),407 it is not subject to other parts of the 
FDCPA.408  Congress made a distinction between debt collection and the 
enforcement of security interests for good reason.  In the former case, 
Congress was concerned about the gross abuses which occur when 
consumers are unable to pay their debts because of unforeseen 
circumstances.409  On the other hand, an enforcer of a security interest 
tries to recover property which is subject to a security interest and which 
is in the debtor’s possession.  The debtor’s failure to return the property 
does not usually result from some misfortune, but rather from the 
debtor’s deliberate decision to avoid turning over the property to the 
enforcer.410  Therefore, the harassment and unfair tactics which the 
FDCPA seeks to regulate in the case of debt collection do not relate to 
the actions of an enforcer of a security interest. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that Congress has gone a long way towards 
eliminating abusive debt collection practices.  It has devised a statutory 
framework to protect the interests of collectors and consumers alike, with 
the expectation that debt collectors who comply with the statutory 
                                                     
 406. See Larranga, 807 F. Supp. at 113 (finding that the incidental possession of personal 
property was not “property claimed as collateral” and therefore not under the FDCPA). 
 407. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 
 408. See Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 700–01 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding 
that a repossession agency is not a debt collector under FDCPA except under 1692f(6)); Seibel v. 
Soc’y Lease, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 713, 717 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (finding that only § 1692f(6) applied to 
the repossession agency); Clark v. Auto Recovery Bureau, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 543, 546 (D. Conn. 
1994) (finding that generally repossession companies are not within the scope of the FDCPA except 
under § 1692f(6)); Jordan v. Kent Recovery Servs., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 652, 657 (D. Del. 1990) 
(finding that a repossession agency was outside the scope of FDCPA except for § 1692f(6)); FTC 
Staff Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,108 (finding that parties who are only debt collectors under 
§ 1692f(6) are “subject only to that provision and not to the rest of FDCPA”). 
 409. The Senate Report reflected the findings of the National Commission on Consumer 
Finance: “[T]he vast majority of consumers who obtain credit fully intend to repay their debts.  
When default occurs, it is nearly always due to an unforeseen event such as unemployment, 
overextension, serious illness, or marital difficulties or divorce.”  S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 3 (1977), 
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697. 
 410. Jordan, 731 F. Supp. at 658. 
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requirements will not suffer any competitive disadvantage in the 
marketplace.411  Nevertheless, like everything else, there is always room 
for improvement, and the FDCPA is no exception. 
In its effort to promote consistency and simplicity in the FDCPA, 
Congress has sometimes failed to relate the definitions to other parts of 
the statute, thus creating some doubt about congressional intent.  The 
term “communication” has caused problems because the definition is 
simply “the conveying of information regarding a debt . . . through any 
medium.”412  There is no special accommodation for certain legal 
documents like a summons or complaint,413 but this does not mean that a 
collector is helpless in the face of this general definition of 
“communication.”  A debt collector can avoid problems by sending its 
validation notice at least thirty days before attempting suit, thus creating 
no conflict between the notice and the documents relating to the 
lawsuit.414  This should leave no doubt in a consumer’s mind that the 
FDCPA’s requirements are separate from court-related requirements, 
thus avoiding any confusion that might normally arise when the two 
procedures clash and the consumer does not know what to do.  If the 
collector does not want to wait thirty days before suing, the collector 
should provide explanatory language in its collection notice that a 
summons and complaint are different from a validation notice and that 
the consumer must follow the procedures that are judicially mandated for 
the legal documents.415 
                                                     
 411. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2000) (stating that the purpose of the FDCPA is to ensure that 
debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively 
disadvantaged). 
 412. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2000). 
 413. In its first advisory opinion, the FTC stated that “[i]f an attorney debt collector has had no 
prior communications with a consumer before serving a summons or other court document on the 
consumer, that document would constitute the ‘initial communication’ with the consumer if it 
conveys information regarding a debt.”  Advisory Opinion, supra note 23.  Good faith reliance on an 
advisory opinion excuses liability.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e) (2000) (stating no provision of the 
FDCPA imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conforming 
with an advisory opinion of the commission). 
 414. See Thomas v. Law Firm of Simpson & Cybak, 392 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting 
that a creditor can have its initial communication with the debtor upwards of thirty days before 
beginning the litigation process). 
 415. The court in Thomas suggested the following language: 
This advice pertains to your dealings with me as a debt collector.  It does not affect your 
dealings with the court, and in particular it does not change the time at which you must 
answer the complaint.  The summons is a command from the court, not from me, and you 
must follow its instructions even if you dispute the validity or amount of the debt.  The 
advice in this letter also does not affect my relations with the court.  As a lawyer, I may 
file papers in the suit according to the court’s rules and the judge’s instructions. 
392 F.3d at 919–20. 
 This is not the first model letter to originate from the Seventh Circuit.  See Miller v. McCalla, 
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It is regrettable that the validation section has caused debt collectors 
such agony.  Although it is designed to ensure that a collector will inform 
the consumer of the basic details of the transaction and of the right to 
dispute the debt,416 debt collectors have fallen prey to their own recovery 
strategies.  But it is not entirely their fault because Congress has sent 
mixed messages with the validation provision.  If Congress wanted to 
give a consumer a genuine chance to verify the validity of the debt, it 
would not simultaneously allow the collector to continue badgering the 
consumer in the interim.  The collector is left to its own devices to craft 
acceptable language that discharges its statutory responsibility, but at the 
same time it pressures the consumer about the debt.417  The validation 
section legitimizes these dual interests and clothes them with 
respectability.  It is as if Congress wanted to give a consumer some small 
measure of protection without giving him too much leeway to question 
the debt. 
If the consumer has the courage to dispute the debt, the collector 
must suspend its collection activities until it verifies the debt.418  It is 
noteworthy that the collector does not have to tell the consumer that this 
is what will happen if the consumer disputes the debt.419  It is but another 
                                                                                                                                  
Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2000) (providing a 
model letter that satisfies the debt collector’s duty to state the amount of debt in cases where the 
amount varies daily); Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 501–02 (7th Cir. 1997) (providing form letter 
for debt collector seeking to inform debtor of collector’s intention to resort to legal action before 
expiration of thirty-day window in which debtor may seek verification of debt pursuant to FDCPA). 
 416. The Senate Report captured the basic purpose of the validation section in these words:  
“This provision will eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong person or 
attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already paid.”  S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977), 
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699. 
 417. See Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 2005) (involving 
creditor who sent initial letter to debtor plus two follow up letters); Shimek v. Forbes, 374 F.3d 
1011, 1012 (11th Cir. 2004) (involving collector filing a lien at the same time it sent dunning letter 
to consumer); McStay v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 188, 189 (2d Cir. 2002) (involving dunning letter 
stating that if account was not paid in thirty days debtor would be reported to credit reporting 
agencies); Renick v. Dun & Bradstreet Receivable Mgmt. Servs., 290 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 
2002) (involving second notice to debtor including instruction that debtor use tear-off portion to send 
payment “today”); Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 351 (3d Cir. 2000) (involving letter 
which notifed debor that account had been placed for “immediate collection” and that it shall afford 
the opportunity to pay the bill immediately); Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1059 
(7th Cir. 1999) (involving letter demanding that debtor pay debt promptly or face legal action or 
reporting to credit bureau); Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(involving demand for immediate payment on front of letter without explaining demand did not 
override consumer’s rights under FDCPA to seek debt validation from creditor); United States v. 
Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1996) (involving letter stating that the debtor’s 
account would be transferred to an attorney if the amount was unpaid after the deadline date and 
reminding debtor that the debtor’s attorney would also want to be paid). 
 418. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (2000). 
 419. Despite the lack of this requirement, the model letter in Bartlett v. Heibl does tell the 
consumer that the debt collector must suspend its collection activities.  128 F.3d at 502; see also 
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example of the statute giving some halfway remedy, but not really 
wanting to go the whole way by imposing an obligation on the creditor to 
advise the consumer of the ensuing suspension of collection activities.  
One suspects that it would be better for the statute to prescribe a 
cessation period during which the consumer can challenge the debt 
without fear of being pursued by the collector.420  It is only then that a 
consumer can truly enjoy his statutory option; otherwise it is only a 
feeble measure that hardly restrains the collector. 
On another front, Congress should require the validation notice to be 
in writing if it wants to ensure that the consumer will assimilate the 
information.421  There is nothing in the statute that requires an initial 
communication to be written, and thus the collector may include the 
validation information in such a communication.  It cannot be seriously 
argued that a consumer can obtain effective notice of the details in this 
manner.  A consumer must be able to act on the information contained in 
the validation notice, and he will be unable to do so if he cannot recall 
the statutory rights which the collector read off to him in its initial 
communication. 
Finally, some change would be welcome in the language of § 
1692f(8) to address the problem that Congress had in mind.  Surely it 
                                                                                                                                  
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 33, § 5.7.3.4, at 239 (stating that the FDCPA does not 
require that consumers be notified that debt collectors, after receiving a timely written dispute or 
request for validation, must suspend collection until the collectors verify the debt). 
 420. This approach would convert the current thirty-day dispute period into a true grace period.  
The FTC and the cases agree that the statute does not currently support a grace period.  See Smith v. 
Computer Credit, Inc., 167 F.3d 1052, 1055 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that a collection agency does not 
have to cease collection efforts to comply with the Act but must ensure that its efforts do not threaten 
a consumer’s right to dispute the validity of the debt); Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 501 (noting a debt 
collector must cease his efforts at collection only between the time of consumer’s request for 
verification of the debt and the collector’s verification to the debtor); 2005 FTC ANN. REP., supra 
note 309, at 14–15 (stating the Commission has consistently taken the position that collection efforts 
can continue during the thirty-day period if the consumer does not dispute the debt in writing or 
request verification, but noting that some continue to argue that the thirty-day period is a grace 
period). 
 421. Although the FTC is concerned with the clarity of a written validation notice, it has not 
dealt with the possibility of having an oral validation notice in light of a possible initial 
communication that need not be written.  The FTC recommended in its 2005 annual report that 
“Congress amend Section 809 of the FDCPA to make explicit the standard for clarity to be applied 
to the consumer notice required by that section.”  2005 FTC ANN. REP., supra note 309, at 13 
(footnote omitted).  However, the consumer notice may be conveyed in the collector’s initial 
communication, but that communication need not be in writing.  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) 
(2000) (stating within five days after initial communication the debt collector must send the 
consumer written notice containing certain information unless the information was contained in the 
intial communication), with 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2000) (defining the term “communication” to 
include the conveying of information through any medium).  So the FTC’s observation that “Section 
809(a) requires debt collectors to send a written notice to each consumer within five days after first 
contacting the consumer” does not address the method of the first contact.  2005 FTC ANN. REP., 
supra note 309, at 13. 
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must have been to spare consumers the embarrassment of having their 
private business exposed to the world at large.  When the section forbade 
a collector from using any language on an envelope other than a debt 
collector’s address, it went overboard to achieve its objective.  Courts 
were left, therefore, to apply the section sensibly, even though Congress 
must have known what it was doing when it used the word “any” in 
trying to control a collector’s conduct.422  Surely it was possible for the 
drafters to use limiting language that had some relation to the objective 
that Congress sought to achieve.  The prohibition should relate to the 
debt which the collector is trying to collect, but language which gives no 
clue about the business between the collector and the consumer should 
not be within the purview of the section. 
                                                     
 422. See Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 316, 319 (8th Cir. 2004) (refusing 
to apply a strict reading of § 1692f(8) and thus exempting benign words and symbols provision 
because a strict reading would lead to bizarre and impracticable consequences); Goswami v. Am. 
Collections Enter., Inc., 377 F.3d 488, 493–94 (5th Cir. 2004) (using an FTC comment and 
legislative history to conclude the FDCPA does not bar innocuous priority letter markings); Peter v. 
GC Servs., L.P., 310 F.3d 344, 351 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that § 1692f(8) does not prohibit the 
placing of a stamp or the debtor’s address on an envelope); Lindbergh v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 846 
F. Supp. 175, 180 (D. Conn. 1994) (refusing to apply a mechanical interpretation of § 1692f(8)); 
Johnson v. NCB Collection Servs., 799 F. Supp. 1298, 1305 (D. Conn. 1992) (holding that the use of 
“Revenue Department” in the return address of a collection notice is not the type of abusive 
collection practice the FDCPA was intended to affect); Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., 759 F. 
Supp. 1456, 1466 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (refusing to apply § 1698f(8) literally in every case). 
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